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S. HRG. 104-314

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Y 4. AR 5/3: S. HRG. 104-314

U.S. National Security Strategy, S.... **INGS**

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 2 AND 7, 1995

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



MAR 03 1995

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(III)

THE FOUNDATIONS OF U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1995

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Cohen, McCain, Coats, Kempthorne, Hutchison, Santorum, Exon, Levin, Glenn, and Lieberman.

Committee staff members present: Richard L. Reynard, staff director; George W. Lauffer, deputy staff director; Donald A. Deline, minority counsel; Melinda M. Koutsoumpas, chief clerk; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, deputy chief clerk; and Christine K. Cimko, press secretary.

Professional staff members present: Charles S. Abell, Romie L. Brownlee, Stephen L. Madey, Jr., Thomas G. Moore, Joseph G. Pallone, Steven C. Saulnier, and Eric H. Thoemmes.

Minority staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, minority staff director; Andrew S. Effron, minority counsel; Richard E. Combs, Jr., Patrick T. Henry, T. Kirk McConnell, and Frank Norton, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Pamela L. Farrell, Shelley G. Lauffer, Kathleen M. Paralusz, and Deasy Wagner.

Committee members' assistants present: Judith A. Ansley, assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Ann E. Sauer, assistant to Senator McCain; Samuel D. Adcock, assistant to Senator Lott; Richard F. Schwab, assistant to Senator Coats; Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith; Glen E. Tait, assistant to Senator Kempthorne; George K. Johnson, Jr., assistant to Senator Hutchison; Matthew Hay, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Patricia L. Stalnacker, assistant to Senator Santorum; Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Richard W. Fieldhouse and David A. Lewis, assistants to Senator Levin; Steven A. Wolfe, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Patricia J. Buckheit and Suzanne M. McKenna, assistants to Senator Glenn; C. Richard D'Amato and Lisa W. Tuite, assistants to Senator Byrd; Suzanne Dabkowski, assistant to Senator Robb; John F. Lilley, assistant to Senator Lieberman; and Randall A. Schieber, assistant to Senator Bryan.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND,
CHAIRMAN

Chairman THURMOND. The committee will come to order.

We have the pleasure of having Dr. Kissinger with us today. Dr. Kissinger, I am pleased to welcome you to today's hearing as we take up the serious matter of America's national security planning. We are honored by your presence, and we look forward to your discussion of America's interests, goals, and commitments.

It is ironic that the passing of the Cold War has in many ways complicated our national security planning. We no longer have a single, overwhelming threat to guide our thinking in this area. Instead, we face diverse and more unpredictable threats. In this environment, it is all the more necessary for the United States to have a clear national security strategy to guide our military planning and operations.

Given the uncertain nature of the threats we are likely to face in the future, we must find an appropriate basis for our national security strategy. This foundation must be firmly anchored to our own national interests and objectives. Unfortunately, this job remains incomplete.

I remain concerned that the United States has in recent years allowed budgetary pressures, rather than a coherent strategy, to drive our military planning. Today, we remain without a clear and compelling national security strategy to guide us. Without this, we will surely waste money and put at risk our most precious resource, the fine men and women in the Armed Forces.

We have asked Dr. Kissinger to address the foundations of American national security strategy as the committee prepares to examine U.S. military planning and budgeting. Dr. Kissinger, we are particularly interested to hear your testimony on what you see as America's interests, goals, and commitments. By exploring these underlying pillars of national strategy, we hope to gain a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of American defense planning. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Senator Thurmond, thank you very much.

Dr. Kissinger, welcome to you. I first want to say Senator Nunn, who would usually be speaking at this time for the minority, is necessarily absent this morning. He asked me to express his regrets to you, with our thanks for all that you have done over the years. He also was good enough to afford me some notes that he took from a discussion that you had at some organizational meeting back in November where a whole multitude of things were discussed that will undoubtedly be covered here that he was very much impressed with.

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling this hearing on the foundations of the U.S. national security strategy. This hearing, coming after last week's Intelligence Committee briefings on the worldwide threat situation, will provide, I suggest, an excellent framework, along with next week's hearings on implementing U.S. strategy and U.S. force planning, for our consideration of the President's defense budget. I want to add my warm welcome to Dr. Kissinger, whose credentials have already been fully described by you and well known to all.

Dr. Kissinger, I look forward to your testimony and to the opportunity to have some questions to get your views on as we proceed with this hearing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. We will allow 2 minutes for an opening statement by any other member. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I just join you in welcoming our distinguished guest, who does bring a perspective and a corporate memory of this subject which is second to none. We thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. The Senator from Maine.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman, could I have my 2 minutes of opening added to my time for questioning?

Chairman THURMOND. That will be all right. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. No statement, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Hutchison.

Senator HUTCHISON. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say that I think Secretary Kissinger has given us a blueprint for our role in the world through his latest book, "Diplomacy," which I know Senator McCain has read and I have read part of it. I think it is very important for this committee, as we are trying to determine what our military strategy should be in the world, that we hear from Secretary Kissinger about a bigger picture, what is our role in the world in general, what should our relationship be with our allies, and he has been particularly active in writing about our NATO alliance and a clear understanding of what our potential threats are.

So I very much appreciate this opportunity, and I hope that we can move toward something that really President Truman did in 1950 with the NSC-68, and that is to have a blueprint for where we ought to be going to solidify our place in the world, both with our allies and our enemies.

Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I first want to thank you for inviting Secretary Kissinger. Welcome to you Secretary Kissinger. We are, in former Secretary of State Dean Acheson's words, present at the creation of a new world. The birth is taking some period of time beyond the normal gestation period, which is probably understandable for the dramatic changes that have taken place, post-Cold War, but I think, Mr. Chairman, it is so important that you have invited the Secretary here because I do not know of anyone in this country who has spoken with more acuity, with more insight, with a broader vision, and with an appropriate combination of American ideals and American interests about the course of our foreign policy.

I consider, if I may not institutionalize you at this moment, Dr. Kissinger, that you are one of America's great natural resources, and it is helpful to have the benefit of your counsel this morning as we consider how to support America's interests with a military budget.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Dr. Kissinger, you may proceed now with your statement.

**STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER
SECRETARY OF STATE**

Dr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I greatly appreciate the very generous comments that have been made, and also the opportunity to meet with you. As I told your staff director, I will make a few substantially extemporaneous and informal remarks, and then look forward to answering your questions.

The United States finds itself at this moment in, for it, an unprecedented situation. We have had an extraordinary success in accomplishing almost everything we set out to do at the end of World War II. If you compare what American leaders were saying in the late 1940s and early 1950s about our objectives and our purposes with what happened in the late 1980s and early 1990s, you will find a degree of correspondence for which I find no previous example in history. It has, however, left us in a position that George Bernard Shaw once described as follows: there are two tragedies in life: One is to fail to fulfill your heart's desires, and the second is to fulfill your heart's desires.

We have transcended the world we inherited at the end of World War II. I agree with Senator Hutchison. It took us 3 or 4 years at the end of World War II to come up with a concept, a strategy, to have our domestic debate, but after that, it is astonishing with what degree of bipartisan commitment it was carried out until the collapse of the Soviet Union during the Reagan and Bush administrations. We do not have a similar consensus at this moment, and I believe it is important for the United States to develop a strategy appropriate for the period in which we find ourselves.

As a Nation, we have had a unique international position. No other major nation has been populated almost entirely by immigrants. No other major nation has a definite date to which you can ascribe its origin. Above all, no other major nation has lived without powerful neighbors, and therefore the United States has had to believe, for the greatest part of its history, even during the Cold War, that the degree of its involvement was largely up to it. Almost all of the great programs of even the Cold War period, like the Marshall Plan, were presented as relatively short-term programs, as terminal programs, at the end of which the need for that sort of commitment would disappear. Almost all our international commitments were triggered by a specific enemy, ideological or strategic, and in the Cold War they were the same. It was both an ideological and a strategic enemy.

In the period into which we are now heading, there is no clearcut ideological enemy, or maybe there are several ideological adversaries. There is no overwhelming strategic adversary, and yet the American capacity to play a role and to intervene can be the major stabilizing element in many parts of the world. It is not possible to present final solutions to many of the problems that we see in front of us, and we live in a paradoxical world in which the economy, communications, have become global, while at the same time more and more small states are coming into being that feel no responsibility to any global international system or to international stability. These are the dilemmas and challenges within which American foreign policy has to be conducted. Let me very briefly touch a few of the key areas as I see them.

I have become increasingly convinced, though this has not been a subject that the Armed Services Committee has primarily addressed, of the crucial importance of creating a Western Hemisphere economic and political system. And for that reason, I strongly support the decision of President Clinton yesterday with respect to the aid package to Mexico. I look at this not as a bail-out, but rather as an element of construction.

In the world that is emerging, if GATT works, it is important for the United States to be in the strongest possible competitive position. If GATT does not work, or if it turns out, which is not impossible, that it brings about unacceptable penalties for American working forces, then it is important that the Western Hemisphere has a regional system that can compete with regional systems that may be growing up in Europe and in Asia. And, finally, America has always believed that market institutions and democracy can be an element of unifying the international community.

I do not know whether that applies to the whole world. In fact, I have my doubts. But I do believe that it applies to the Western Hemisphere, in which geopolitics have played a smaller role than in any other region. And so for all of these reasons, I think the construction of our foreign policy in the next phase must have, as a principal element, a healthy, vital, Western Hemisphere system, and I look at what has been done with respect to Mexico in that context, and not as an economic bail-out.

Traditionally, any such analysis as I am making here would have begun not with the Western Hemisphere but with the Atlantic Alliance. I still believe that the Atlantic Alliance must be a key element of American foreign policy. And I am uneasy about the tendencies toward its erosion, partly as a result of the end of the Cold War, but also partly as a result of lack of adequate attention.

In Western Europe, and in Western and Central Europe, we are united with countries that have similar values and that, on the whole, not always perfectly, have stood with us in almost all of the crises of the post-Cold War period. It is becoming increasingly apparent that an American participation in Europe is essential, lest the national rivalries, the fears of a too powerful Germany or an encroaching Russia, will lead to the disintegration of the common policies that have developed there. But at the same time, I am uneasy because with the movement of Russian troops east, with the collapse of the satellite orbit in Eastern Europe, in Eastern and Central Europe, there has not been a unifying element and there has not been a significant American initiative with respect to the restoration of the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance.

I do not believe that the Partnership for Peace is such an initiative. The Atlantic Alliance is an alliance; that is, it has a clear definition of the area that it protects. The Partnership for Peace is a vague system of collective security like the United Nations, including all the territory from Vladivostok to Vancouver. And in my view, if everybody is allied with everybody, nobody is allied, really, in any meaningful way with anybody. It is a different concept. It is not an alliance concept. It is an alternative to an alliance concept, and was so presented by President Clinton.

In my view, the expansion of NATO is one of the key challenges before American politics, and think it is necessary to make an un-

ambiguous decision with respect to that. By expansion of NATO, I mean the inclusion of some of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, preferably Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, possibly Slovakia, in the NATO Alliance. And I believe this is important for the following reasons.

It makes no sense to have the border of NATO at the eastern border of Germany, which is not threatened and which has no plausible security threat, and to leave ambiguous the eastern border of Poland. I believe it is dangerous to have a vacuum between Russian and Germany which both of these nations will then try to fill by their national efforts. I believe that the security of the eastern border of the Atlantic Alliance should be an alliance problem, not a German national challenge. And for these reasons and for others which we might elaborate in the question period, in the discussion period, I believe that NATO expansion is essential.

I do not believe that it can be handled as a study project. It requires a decision, not a study. We know what is needed. And we know what the arguments against it are. And by keeping open the question of whether it is a part of the Partnership for Peace or a part of the Atlantic Alliance, we actually confuse both efforts. I am not clear what our official position is. If it is for expansion, I support it. If it is a mishmash in which Russia is supposed to join the Atlantic Alliance, then I believe it is going to lead to undermining the Atlantic Alliance, and thereby one of the major building blocks of the international system as I understand it.

Let me make a few observations about Asia. In Europe, we are dealing with a group of countries among which a military conflict is almost out of the question. The military conflicts in Europe arise at the fringes among new countries that have not been part of the postwar European order. But Asia sees the emergence of a whole group of nations whose attitude toward each other is very similar to that of European states in the 19th century. The Asian part of Russia, Japan, China, Korea, and Southeast Asia do not look at each other as part of one community. They look at each other as strategic economic and political competitors.

Moreover, all of them are emerging into a new set of national attitudes. During the Cold War, Japan could nestle under the American security guarantee because there was only one plausible strategic threat. In the period ahead of us, almost any foreseeable Japanese leader may well discover that with respect to many of the issues of Northeast Asia, Japan has at least shades of difference with the United States. And I therefore consider it highly likely that Japan will play a more assertive, more autonomous, and more self-reliant role. This is not, in itself, against the American interest. But it means that the single focus of our discussion with Japan has to be broadened from trade to political, strategic, and general issues of world order, which is not an easy assignment given the cultural differences between our two countries and the different way we conceive of the role of dialogue.

Anybody who has visited China must be struck by the extraordinary, almost unbelievable, economic change that has taken place in that country. Any comparison between China a decade ago and today—a country that has grown at an average rate of over 10 percent for over a decade—indicates that China will emerge as per-

haps the most powerful country in Asia over a 30-year period, and a country of growing significance economically, politically, and strategically. Many of the discussions about Chinese internal practices will be importantly altered by the very pace of industrialization, because while industrialization may not guarantee democracy, it does require as an initial step constitutionalism, a legal framework that can be expected and to which people, foreigners and domestically, can gear themselves.

For the United States, it is very difficult to imagine that we can play the decisive role in Asian stability that is achievable without constructive relations with the People's Republic of China. We are entitled to have our own view as to appropriate domestic practices, and the Chinese have dealt, in the 5000 years of their recorded history, with enough foreigners to know that they have to take account of strongly held convictions. But what we cannot do is to make one issue the single test of our relationship. And what we must do in a positive sense is to find a means for a dialogue with China on a continuing basis about the relationship between the key elements in Asia.

We have all been concerned in recent months with the situation on the Korean Peninsula and we have a number of problems. The most important, the most immediate, is the nuclear issue. The longer-term problem is the relationship of South and North Korea to each other. And the third which rarely gets talked about is the attitude of the surrounding countries to the future of Korea. Let me take the last one first.

The United States has every reason to favor the unification of Korea. The neighboring countries are much less enthusiastic about this prospect, and I do not think one can understand either Chinese or Japanese policies except against the at least subconscious preference—and not so subconscious, either—that their leaders would not die unfulfilled if unification of Korea were put off into some future generation, or maybe never happen. And this affects their attitude, even toward the nuclear issue.

Nobody wants North Korea to have nuclear weapons. But other countries are calculating to what extent they want to exercise pressure that might undermine the North Korean Government. From the American point of view, I believe that proliferation of nuclear weapons to North Korea will set a terrible precedent for the rest of the world. I did not favor the way the Framework Agreement was negotiated, nor the tacit acceptance of what North Korea has already done in the nuclear field. On the other hand, I do not see that abandoning this agreement now is going to meet those particular concerns. I find it almost unimaginable that this agreement will go to the end of its foreseen route, and therefore we should think carefully of how we can be sure to enforce its provisions and what we will do when the pushing against the edges will take place. I think that is our most important task with respect to the Korean nuclear issue.

In foreign policy one occasionally has the choice whether to support one's friend or to placate one's enemies—or I would say if one has the choice, one should begin by supporting one's friends. The strategy of North Korea with respect to South Korea is to delegitimize it to make itself the chief spokesman for Korean unity

and to lure us into a set of negotiations that make it appear that South Korea is our tool. We have to be very careful to prevent these tendencies, and as a general principle, we should have no discussions with North Korea about the future of Korea that exclude South Korea, and no discussions with North Korea that South Korea does not feel it has been fully briefed on.

Now, I do not want to go around Asia and analyze every country. I want to make one general proposition. The United States is in a unique position in Asia in this sense: If you ask any Asian leader, Northeast or Southeast Asia, what they consider their principal threat to their security or the principal obstacle to progress, none would mention the United States. All would mention some other Asian country. I have heard it said that Southeast Asia divides itself into two groups of countries. Those that fear Vietnam want good relations with China. Those that are worried about China want good relations with Vietnam. But all want good relations with the United States. So our asset in Asia is if we conduct our policy skillfully that we can be closer to each of them than they are to each other. We can afford friendly relations and we should have friendly relations with all Asian countries, and then at critical moments can throw our weight in the direction most compatible with our values, our purposes, and our perception of the requirements of stability. This, of course, presupposes that we have a clear idea of what these are and that we cultivate these relationships, and therefore we have to be careful not to get trapped into one-issue problems unless they are of truly overriding importance.

Now, I do not present this as an exhaustive view of our challenges, but I want to end as I began. The United States now needs some agreed, hopefully bipartisan, approach to the new world that is emerging. I hear it often said that in this new world there are new issues like environment, population, immigration, economics—and that is absolutely true, and we have to be ready to understand and guide them. But it is also true that in many parts of the world the perception of international affairs has been more fragmented, and that it requires a degree of American leadership that is subtler and more differentiated than was necessary during the Cold War.

I do not claim that I have an answer to every policy problem. I have tried to lay out the conceptual challenges that we face, and having done so, I would be glad to answer your questions. Thank you very much.

Chairman THURMOND. We will now proceed with questions. Since Dr. Kissinger has to leave at 12:30, we will limit the time of questions in the first round to 7 minutes to ensure every member present has an opportunity to ask questions.

Dr. Kissinger, in your recent book, "Diplomacy," you describe at length the difficulty U.S. leaders have had in the past transitioning from one major era to another. As we proceed with another such historical transition, should we be seeking a unifying theme or doctrine to guide us, much as containment did during the Cold War?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, it is not so easy to come up with one unifying theme. I can state some negative—well, I will say one positive one. I think it is important for us to pay more attention to the Western Hemisphere than was necessary in the previous period.

Second, I believe we have a national interest to prevent the domination of either Europe or Asia by one potential superpower. Therefore, we have an interest in a close relationship with Western and Central Europe as part of the same system with us, and also to bring about, as far as Europe is concerned, an evolution in Russia that is compatible with these objectives.

In this respect, and I should have covered this in my remarks, there are two schools of thought. One is that we should try to concentrate on shaping Russian domestic institutions and supporting particular leaders. There is another school of thought to which I belong that holds we are likely to be most effective by trying to affect Russian foreign policy. We dealt with in the Cold War both communism and imperialism, and while communism has been defeated, the trend toward imperialism still exists. And so from that point of view, I believe a clear definition of foreign limits, together with a conciliatory approach within those, is the best strategy.

In Asia, I think I have sketched what I believe our policy should be.

Chairman THURMOND. Dr. Kissinger, could you briefly outline for the committee how you see U.S. national security interests, and how you would categorize and rank these?

Dr. KISSINGER. How would I rank American security interests? Well, I really believe I would give those three areas that I covered about equal priority. If you ask me to describe the challenges to our national security, I would mention that the growth of Islamic Fundamentalists may present the most serious immediate challenge to us. Attacking, as it does, all the moderate secular regimes in the Middle East, it could produce mass migrations and great upheavals that would undermine both the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis but also the general stability in the Middle East.

Chairman THURMOND. Dr. Kissinger, during the Cold War, U.S. national security interests were often viewed as synonymous with containment of the Soviet threat and the spread of communism. As we face an era of greater uncertainty, should we continue to look to threats as the principal source for driving national security strategy?

Dr. KISSINGER. I missed the last part of the question.

Chairman THURMOND. As we face an era of greater uncertainty, should we continue to look to threats as the principal source for driving national security strategy?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, it is a different situation than it was during the Cold War. In the Cold War we could size our military forces in relation to specific threats. In the next period, we have to develop our military forces in regard to potential situations that might arise, even though we cannot define the individual threat precisely. And so we do not have the advantage of a yardstick in which we simply measure how much the Soviet Union has. We have to think of potential situations of instability, and this means, to my mind, that we need mobile forces, forces with lift capability; that we need a high degree of reconnaissance ability of a different kind than we needed during the Cold War. [Pause.]

Chairman THURMOND. My time is now up. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Dr. Kissinger, I listened with great interest to what you have had to say. I would like to ask this dual question of you because I think it is related, with the new challenges that we have with regard to our budget, I would like to ask you if you have any opinions on the future level of defense funding that you think is necessary on an annual basis. I do not know whether you have studied that or not. If so, I would like your statement on that.

We have heavy obligations around the world. Sometimes I almost yearn for the return to the days of yesteryear when we had a more defined policy and to the Cold War that we knew pretty much what to do and how to do it. Do you have any ideas on dollar-wise defense spending? If you have addressed it, I would like to have your recommendation.

And that ties into what I would like to ask you whether you think the ability to fight and win two regional wars nearly simultaneously is a logical, proper definition which should be guiding our defense policies. If not, what other kind of a formula would you suggest we use?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I really do not think, Senator, I have a contribution to make on funding levels. I have read the various studies that have been made by Congressional Budget Office, by the Heritage Foundation, and many of them seem to emphasize shortcomings in readiness, but I have no opinion of my own as to what the appropriate level is. I personally, for example, believe that we have to look at missile defense, which would be an additional funding requirement. But I would not want to put a specific number on it.

Now, the problem with the two war scenario, on the one hand, in the present period it is not so easy to describe even one war that we might be fighting. On the other hand, it is true that if we fought one war we must not be in a position where if, for example, we get drawn into a conflict in Korea, Iran or some other country in the Middle East believes that it now has a free pass to achieve whatever objectives it has to unsettle the situation there. So it seems to me a reasonable proposition not to be in a situation where if we are involved somewhere we are then naked everywhere else. Now, whether you express it as a two-war or how you express it, I think the concept is one that I find acceptable.

Senator EXON. Let us talk about North Korea a little more. You addressed it some in your testimony. From your viewpoint, has the passing of Kim Il-song made chances of reaching more accommodations with North Korea more difficult or less?

Dr. KISSINGER. I have not met anybody in Asia or anywhere else, including close neighbors of Korea, who have any idea of what is going on in Pyongyang. Nobody has met Kim Il-song's son, and nobody knows whether he has inherited it or has been shunted aside. So I am not sure that one can define it entirely in terms of openness or its opposite.

There is a school of thought that argues North Korea is going to collapse. As I have indicated, there are some neighbors that may not like North Korea but also are not eager to see it collapse. So this is question we will have continuously to reexamine, because I do believe that whatever we think of the terms of this North Korean nuclear agreement, it will not go to the end of its term, and,

therefore, we will constantly be up against pushing against the edges of this, unless the North Korean regime collapses, of which I have no opinion. But that will not be determined by the openness of its present leaders, but by the decrepitude of the overall economic situation.

Senator EXON. One last question, and then I will allow things to move along. I was very pleased with your assessment of NATO, how important NATO is, and I think, Dr. Kissinger, people like you who have had experience and helped put NATO together are ones that we should be listening to with regard to its future. When I hear the views of some, such as NATO has outlived its usefulness, it is pretty shocking. I think that we have got to be awfully careful in this area.

Let me have you amplify briefly, if you can, on the concerns that are making the rounds in Congress today with regard to how NATO plays into the obligations of the United Nations and that the United States should not be a police-keeping action force for the United Nations. It seems to me like with all of these concerns that we have, whether or not we should ever have an American soldier under some commander that might not be an American, can you sum up how you feel about these concerns and how serious you think they are?

Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to your first question, NATO is the only institutional framework that links America to Western and Central Europe. The unification of Germany has upset many of the presuppositions on which the Cold War system was based and therefore the relationship between the various European nations to each other depends crucially on a continued American participation. And considering the uncertainties, to put it mildly, of what happens to the East of Central Europe, I think that NATO remains vital. However, it must be given a new geographical definition, must be given a new political definition, and within it the role and responsibilities of Europe, could probably be increased.

Now, on the relationship of NATO to peacekeeping, insofar as this refers to Bosnia, I believe it was a grave mistake to marry a NATO participation to a U.N. participation. Those are two totally different institutions.

Second, I believe there is a general proposition if American forces are used they should be for purposes that can, at a minimum, be strongly shared by ordinary Americans and that are not defined in the first instance by international institutions. Therefore, if NATO uses its military force, there should be a clear NATO objective, and there should not be two layers, one of NATO and then another one in which the U.N., which really is, as I said before, a system of collective security operating by different maxims. So mixing the two together was almost bound to lead to a misunderstanding.

Third, with respect to Bosnia, while it is true that the Europeans have not done everything we wanted, there has also been a gap between some of our American stated objectives and what we were willing to do to back them up. So as a general proposition, I believe, when American forces are used they should be for purposes, of course together with allies when appropriate, but that can clearly be related to American national interests, and they should not be defined in the first instance by international organizations.

I would also make a distinction between peacekeeping that is where an agreement has already been reached and the question is primarily to police it, and peacemaking which is where you are trying to impose a settlement on two conflicting parties. And I think the latter, which requires the use of military force in an affirmative way, should be particularly governed by the need to define an American interest in relation to it.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Before calling on Senator Warner, I want to take this opportunity to welcome Senator Kempthorne back to today's hearing. He has been absent lately from the committee activities while managing the unfunded mandates bill. We are happy to have him back. He did an excellent job on the unfunded mandates bill, and we are pleased to have him as a member of this committee.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your comments. I appreciate it greatly.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Kissinger, an excellent presentation, and I would like to pick up on that last point and see if we can draw from your wisdom a tight definition to guide the future decision-making as it relates to the deployment of U.S. troops abroad. We saw in the Somalia action a quick switch of public opinion after the tragic loss of a number of our troops in a combat situation, a clamor by Congress to return our troops home by Christmas, and a very narrow vote margin by which Congress decided to let the President make the decision to withdraw our troops in March.

In the Haiti situation, in my judgment, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate, if they had had the opportunity, would have voted in favor of sending the troops into Haiti.

As we look at our defense budget today, the likelihood of added funds, given the balanced budget drive, is not likely. This committee is on record seeking a level funding in real terms comparable to last year's level. It seems to me that the way we will have to invoke savings, if you want to put it that way, is to send our forces abroad in fewer instances, and we must have a clearer definition as to those situations into which we will put our troops, be it peacemaking, which has a high risk of combat, or peacekeeping, which has a lesser but still a risk of combat losses.

So how would you define the criteria by which our President should make the decision to send troops abroad?

Dr. KISSINGER. Let me first state my reaction to the two instances you mentioned.

I had great doubts, which I expressed at the time, about the initial decision by the Bush administration to send troops to Somalia. Because I did not believe that the distribution of food, however worthy as a humanitarian objective, was something for which American combat forces should be used. And I feared that this would lead to an open-ended commitment.

The current administration escalated our commitment even further by wanting the United States to involve itself in nation-building in Somalia.

I believe we had a humanitarian interest in distributing food, but no security interest. I believe we had no national interest in using combat troops to build a nation in Somalia. And, therefore, we got ourselves involved in something that was likely to cause casualties that the American public would not support.

I had my doubts about the operation in Haiti on a number of grounds. There is something anomalous about asking the concurrence of the United Nations but not the concurrence of the Congress.

Second, some of the arguments we used in supporting the incursion—or whatever one calls it technically—in Haiti for the first time granted outside nations a right to intervene in the Western Hemisphere which, since the Monroe Doctrine, we have consistently rejected. And it also tended to put on an equal level what we were doing in Haiti with the sort of thing that the Russians later did in Chechnya.

So, there again, while I had great sympathy for the objective, I had my doubts about the use of American military forces. As a general proposition, I think American military forces should be used only in cases of demonstrable threats to American security either immediately or in a situation where it is reasonable to argue that if one does not resist at that point, one will face graver threats growing out of that first threat further down the road. Which is what I think was the case in the Gulf war.

Senator WARNER. So let me clarify the use of the word "security." You mean national security interests?

Dr. KISSINGER. American national security interests.

Now, those can have a global significance. I would find it perfectly rational for somebody to say we have to defend Country X; because if we do not do that, the consequences down the road will so threaten American security then that a much bigger effort will be needed. Which is what, more or less, was the case in the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

But I would be very careful not to use combat forces for the achievement of preferences that are not related to demonstrable security concerns.

Senator WARNER. National security?

Dr. KISSINGER. National security.

Senator WARNER. Now, let us turn to the NATO Partnership for Peace. You have taken issue with the Partnership for Peace. And you said here that it will create a vacuum between the borders.

But, as I look at your analysis, you put in a very important condition here. And that is, in the treaty with Russia that you advocate—the NATO and Russia treaty—you would include a provision that no foreign troops be stationed on the territory of new NATO members.

Now, to me this would be giving these new member states a political fig leaf of NATO membership, but withholding an essential element to provide Article V protection, namely, the presence of forward-deployed troops. You would be placing the NATO commanders at a handicap, a risk, of their troops to transit the territory to get to the troubled areas if they were not allowed to be in a forward-deployed position.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I would distinguish the technical implementation of the extension of NATO from the political extension of NATO. Because the Russians at this moment are at the borders of Poland, for example, in only a very limited area. Between them and Poland is Belarus and Ukraine. And since I believe that the independence of at least Ukraine, but probably also Belarus, is very important for European stability.

One could relate those two commitments to each other, so that if the Russians did violate the independence of those countries, obviously those provisions would no longer apply. But I believe, in any event, that the Article V guarantees, together with some of the common exercises and the prepositioning of equipment, could produce a security situation which would make it very risky to attack these countries.

Senator WARNER. I thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger, I note with appreciation the primacy that you—the primary role that you give Western Hemisphere policy. I think it is very significant. And as you said, traditionally, and probably in past years, you would have listed the Atlantic Alliance as number one.

Dr. KISSINGER. Absolutely.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And I agree with you with that listing.

And may I say, incidentally, that I also appreciate your support this morning of President Clinton's action on Tuesday. Because I do think it was an exercise of leadership in a situation in which the public opinion polls, at least, say it was not popular, but he did what was necessary and what was right.

I wanted to ask you in this regard, as a member of this committee, whether there are any strategic, security, or military implications or any particular focus that this committee should have in response to the primacy of Western Hemisphere interests that the United States has?

Dr. KISSINGER. What is implied for the kind of forces that we built?

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, would you deploy more in this region? I mean, it is hard at the moment to see any obvious threat to our security from this hemisphere.

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not think that the primary challenge in the Western Hemisphere is security. The primary challenge in the Western Hemisphere is economic growth and democratic evolution.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Dr. KISSINGER. And I do not believe that it is necessary for the United States to change the disposition of its forces significantly based on the new primacy to be given to Western Hemisphere relations.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay, I appreciate that.

I suppose Americans have always struggled with a kind of isolationist instinct and a competing interest in internationalism, and we are doing it now. As the exchange you had with Senator Warner suggests, the public response to humanitarian crises as they see them on TV then pulls back when there are human consequences as there were in Somalia, but does not respond—as I think in a

way they are doing now—in Mexico because they do not see the suffering. It is harder to understand the national interest.

In that regard, you made a statement that I want to ask you to draw out a bit. And that is that the United States has a national interest in preventing one superpower from dominating Europe or Asia. And I wanted to ask you just to explain in a little more detail what that national interest is.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, we fought two World Wars to prevent a potentially hostile country from dominating Europe. And the reasoning seems to have been that such a country marshalling the resources of that region would, in time, threaten American security. I think this would be even more true with respect to Asia, where the resources are larger and the population is much more extensive.

Now, in Europe, this requirement has changed somewhat due to the fact of European unification and due to the fact that Europeans are now playing a primarily economic and political and less a strategic role.

In Asia, that reality still exists. On the other hand, it is not something we have to invent because I do not believe that any of the major Asian nations that I mentioned can achieve the domination of Asia without opposition from the others.

We do not have to be the principal opponent of a hegemonial power. We do have to know where our priorities are in conducting our day-to-day policy. And if we conduct it skillfully and consistently, we should be able to prevent the situation from arising where we have to vindicate this objective by military means.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I was going to ask that question which is, in Asia, is the potential threat from a superpower emerging to the United States economic or military?

Dr. KISSINGER. It could become both.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Dr. KISSINGER. But we have to remember, I believe one reason we entered the Korean war was the fear that not to oppose Communist domination of Korea might shake the political orientation of Japan and certainly the political stability of Japan.

Senator LIEBERMAN. A final question: I was interested—as I was in a way by the primacy you gave to the Western Hemisphere interests in your opening remarks, and I know they were not intended to be all-inclusive—that you did not mention the Middle East much at all.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And I would like to ask you about how you would rank our interests in the Middle East at this point, and, if there is time, how you would evaluate the current peace process there.

Dr. KISSINGER. I was noticing I was running out of time, and I thought this is a question that would come up.

I think our interests in the Middle East are very large. But the way to deal with them is extremely complex, because we have several levels of problems. We have the Arab-Israeli conflict. Then we have the conflict within the Islamic world which may or may not be affected by the Arab-Israeli conflict—the conflict between the

secular radicals and the fundamentalist radicals in the Middle East.

And at this meeting today in Cairo, there is actually a common interest that all the participants have, even if they cannot avow it, to resist the Islamic fundamentalism that is trying to undermine the peace process between Israel and the PLO, and thereby also the position of governments like Jordan and Egypt that have been supporting it.

So our policy in that area should be to encourage the peace process, which we have been doing, and to strengthen the moderate regimes.

I would add that I keep reading about dialogue we are supposed to have with the fundamentalists. I believe that will prove as unavailing and as undermining the moderates as was the case in Iran 20 years ago.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger, I think Senator Hutchison has referred to your book on diplomacy, which I looked—it contains 912 pages, including the footnotes and bibliography, which is probably the shortest book you have ever written. And a number of us have read parts, if not all, of it. But I am loathe to try to summarize what you took 912 pages to put forward.

But it seems to me the axiom that ideals without technique frequently is a mess and technique without ideals ends up usually being a menace. And I think we could apply that, for example, to Bosnia as being a current-day mess and Germany under Hitler or Russia under Stalin and his successors as being the menace.

And, as Senator Lieberman has pointed out, the United States is frequently caught in a sort of schizophrenic conflict, being moved on the one hand by Wilsonian idealism and spreading American-conceived notions of democracy to other parts of the world, at the same time being gripped in a state of isolationism from time to time.

And on three occasions during this century, we have proposed creating a so-called New World Order and have been unsuccessful in doing that.

And today we are still struggling with your recommendation, as I suppose it is, to balance our Wilsonian idealism with what you have called a geopolitical balance of power, which your critics, over the years, have dismissed as being either too cynical, too manipulative, too Bismarckian, or whatever the label has been.

But it seems to me that that is really the challenge that we face in foreign policy—how to forge a balance between our ideals and also balancing our interests, and to do so on a bipartisan basis, which is not an easy chore to do.

I was curious about a comment in your book, where you said, "Not every evil can be combated by America, not to mention by America alone, but some monsters need to be slain, or, if not slain, at least restrained. And what is needed most is selectivity."

And I would like to talk about what monsters need to be if not slain, at least restrained, and, specifically, Russia.

In 1993, we passed a providing aid to Russia, and we conditioned it upon Russia recognizing and respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of its neighbors.

Following that, the State Department came back with a report that submitted it endorsed the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity, but it essentially asserted the United States did not know what was going on on the part of the Russian military, and frankly did not intend to try and find out. This was met with some dissatisfaction on Capitol Hill, and we required a report.

They filed a report last year which, while more candid, was labelled "Secret," even though much of the information certainly could have been made public.

And I mention this because just this week I received a briefing from the State Department about the Russian military operations in the Newly Independent States, which I think is remarkable for its incompleteness and, I would suggest, even its fawning character.

It is not written as a public declaration of policy, but it is intended really as a statement to guide about a dozen of us or less who are going over to the Wehrkunde Conference this weekend in Munich. So I think it is not entirely inappropriate for me to quote it to you.

It said, "The United States supports the independence and sovereignty of all NIS states. Full sovereignty includes the right to enter into arrangements such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, or to seek bilateral assistance as initially occurred in Georgia."

I find that a stunning statement, because the Russian military was in fact responsible for helping to foment the civil war in Georgia, nearly bringing Shevardnadze to his knees. And I think we have overlooked the symbolic significance of the embarrassment of Shevardnadze, who was attacked by the Russian nationalists as such—as helping to bring down the U.S.S.R. and the fall of the Berlin Wall, et cetera.

But, nonetheless, having brought him to his knees, then rushing in and offering military aid, provided Georgia agreed to become a part of the CIS, the Commonwealth of Independent States, under the Russian banner. And they have been doing that in area after area with what seems to be the acquiescence on the part of the administration.

Which really is the long way of an introduction to a statement contained in your book on the danger in acquiescing and conduct that is inconsistent with our interests, until a point where it becomes not too late, but much more dangerous to intervene at that time.

And I was wondering about your views on what is taking place in Chechnya, because I think that your comments concerning the failure to express dissatisfaction with international behavior which violates our notions of good behavior, at least, and what are the consequences are for the United States in its dealings with Russia from this point on?

Dr. KISSINGER. Let me just make a very brief comment on your first statement, about the relationship between idealism and prac-

tical politics. And I am sure that brief statement is not going to end the various comments you have cited.

Any assertion of the American national interest must take into account the idealistic tradition of America. This country was uniquely founded on a specific affirmation of liberties and on a turning away from the practices of the European autocracies of this period.

And I must say, for somebody who experienced living in a totalitarian state as I did in my youth, there is no doubt that the participation of America as a symbol of freedom and democracy is one of the great events of history and one of the important factors of our period.

At the same time, in translating these convictions, it is very easy to posture and to assume that posturing is self-implementing. And at the end of the day, political leaders have to be judged by their capacity to move their society from where it is to where they would like it to be, and not simply by affirming some general objective which then becomes an alibi for inaction.

So in this sense, the difference between an academic and a policymaker is that the policymaker is responsible for the consequences and must take into account also the penalties for failure, and not only the descriptions of success. That still leaves plenty of argument in any individual case.

Now, with respect to Russia: Of course, good relations with Russia are one of the key elements of stability in this world. The question is whether one applies this to the goodwill of one group of leaders or to practices of historic Russian policy.

As I indicated earlier, there are two elements in Russian historic policy. One was communism; the other was imperialism. Russia has been expanding in every generation, under czars and commissars. It has changed its shape constantly. And its domestic practices were enormously influenced by the need to hold down, in effect, colonial peoples, whose only difference from the European colonies was that they were at the borders of Russia, rather than at some distance.

From that point of view, the Chechnya war is a colonial war. That is, a territory that was acquired in the second half of the 19th century is being kept under Russian control by force.

And the practices, even if one grants the Russians, as our State Department did, that this is an organic part of Russia, the idea of shelling one's own cities and driving hundreds of thousands of people out into the snow, plus however many people get killed, shows a kind of brutality which is not general in the world, and one which we should not hesitate to condemn.

Now, in a general sense, our foreign policy objective with Russia should be to induce Russia to stay within the borders accepted internationally. And if one considers that St. Petersburg is closer to New York than to Vladivostok, and Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than to Moscow, they should not feel claustrophobic in staying in that territory.

In fact, as you pointed out, Senator, there are Russian troops on the territory of almost every former Republic. The civil wars are fomented or encouraged by these troops that distribute arms in order

to keep them going in Azerbaijan, in Georgia, and almost everywhere in the former Soviet Union.

This has not been opposed internationally. It is unprecedented that a nation keeps its troops on foreign territory to that extent. We cannot use military force to resist it. But I think it is important for Russia—George Kennan once said that the czarist empire collapsed because of overextension.

I believe, in the long run, one is doing Russia a favor by encouraging it, for the first time in its history, to stay at home and to develop its own resources. On that basis, there is no possible area of conflict between us and Russia.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Levin.

Dr. KISSINGER. And I think we should politically oppose the undermining of the former Soviet Republics.

Senator COHEN. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me add my welcome to Dr. Kissinger.

First, on the question of Russia, I think you have written that it is in our interest that Russia continue in its fitful way toward democratization and free market liberation. And we have done a few things, at least, to try to support that process.

Dr. KISSINGER. Right.

Senator LEVIN. Would you condition our support for those two processes on Russia changing its behavior in Chechnya, for instance?

Dr. KISSINGER. I would certainly condition it on Russian behavior in ending the placement of Russian troops all over the former Soviet territory. And in the case of Chechnya, I would be unhappy if we accepted the proposal for a summit issued while the Chechnya operation was going on. I do not know whether I would make the economic aid dependent on it.

Senator LEVIN. Now, relative to the NATO Partnership for Peace issue that you have addressed, in some of your writings you have said the following. You said there as you have here that we ought to make it very clear that we going to admit into NATO three or four countries. But you also have written—and I think that Senator Warner has made reference to this—the following: At the same time, NATO would propose a security treaty between the new NATO and Russia, to make clear that the goal is cooperation.

Would you tell us why you believe it is important that at the same time that we admit three or four additional countries into NATO that we propose a new agreement between the new NATO and Russia?

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not know whether I used the words “security treaty.” If I did, it was unwise.

What I mean is this: We can have Russian participation in political dialogues that affect both NATO and Russia. And I believe that the European Security Conference is a good forum for this. And I would favor expanding that forum and giving Russia an opportunity to participate; and also to be meticulous about consulting with them about things we are doing in the Middle East, so that they do not feel it is aimed at them.

But I would not give Russia a veto over expansion of NATO or continue what I take to be the present trend of believing that somehow we can maneuver them into acquiescence, which really means that the Europeans cannot count on us sticking to it. This ambiguity will undermine expansion and will not help us even in the Partnership.

Senator LEVIN. Putting aside the word "security" for a minute, do you still support a new NATO, the proposal of an agreement between new NATO and Russia?

Dr. KISSINGER. You are quoting me correctly, so I am not trying to weasel out of it. I have since talked to Scandinavian leaders, including Finnish and Norwegians, on the occasion of a trip there. And they have indicated doubts about a formal treaty, because they are afraid that it would lead to constant Russian intervention.

I still favor the concept, not so much of a treaty but, of the result of expanding political consultation with Russia, to make clear that this is a safety net and not the essence of our policy.

Senator LEVIN. On the North Korean agreement, would you like to see that agreement fully implemented? I know that you say you are skeptical that it will be. But is it in our interest that it be fully implemented as it is written?

Dr. KISSINGER. The part I do not like is that we seem to have acquiesced in, at least for an interim period, the North Korean retention of whatever nuclear capability they now have illegally. Which then, in turn, will affect the calculations of the Japanese and others as to their nuclear status.

If the agreement were implemented the way interpreted—that is, that the existing nuclear capability has to be destroyed in an early period, and full inspection has to be carried out—if all of that happened, then I would consider that a desirable outcome. But it is a 10-year period, and I find it very difficult to believe that it will go to the end.

Senator LEVIN. I understand that, but I think it is important that, since this is the subject of so much debate here, that we have a clear answer on this if implemented.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, my view is that what has already been given away cannot be retrieved. For the remainder, I would like to see it implemented.

Senator LEVIN. And, if implemented as it is written and said to be written, that that would be a plus for us?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes; except for the impact, what we have given away, will have on Japan and South Korea. But, yes, from that point on.

Senator LEVIN. Okay, from this point on?

Dr. KISSINGER. From this point on.

Senator LEVIN. Now, in terms of United Nations peacekeeping issues—and here using the word "peacekeeping" in the meaning that you have given to it, not peacemaking but peacekeeping—there has been some failures and some successes on the part of the United Nations. Do you believe that United Nations peacekeeping, at least, can provide a useful function?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, in situations like Cyprus, for example, or even Cambodia, where you have a clear-cut delimitation and where all the parties seem to be agreed to observe the delimitation, so

that you are really trying to deal with violations at the edges, I think United Nations peacekeeping can be useful.

In situations where the conflict between the parties continues, like in Bosnia, where there are no clear delimitations, I think United Nations peacekeeping, absent a clear-cut statement of political objective, is not going to work.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Dr. Kissinger.

Just to clarify your views on Korea again, do you believe that this agreement should have been made with North Korea?

Dr. KISSINGER. I would have preferred a more confrontational approach. But, then, one should not recommend it unless one believes that it would have been really carried through. I do not think it was a good idea to create the impression that a single American interlocutor showing up that could change what was a systematic violation of a signed agreement, and then relying on another signed agreement to implement it.

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Kissinger, you said in your opening remarks that you believe that this agreement would—I believe you said—not come to term; it would fail at some point between now and the approximately 10-year period for full implementation. Why do you believe that is the case?

Dr. KISSINGER. Because basically what this agreement does is to delay the reprocessing of the material that the North Koreans have illegally removed from the reactor. But it does not prevent it. And it also stops—and that is the plus—the production of new plutonium.

In return, however, the illegal extraction of previous plutonium is, more or less, accepted.

Now, the theory of the agreement is that at some point along the way not yet defined, they will agree to let us inspect the waste material. And at that point, if we find some violations, they will destroy whatever diversion has taken place.

We derived that from the implications of the Nonproliferation Treaty from which they have already withdrawn on previous occasions.

So I think that at every point, given the record of a country that, in 1991, agreed to the denuclearization of Korea, and then withdrew from it 2 years later—this is between South and North Korea—that agreed to inspection of its facilities and withdrew from it, I just find it very difficult to believe that all the many steps that have to be taken will be carried on to term in this agreement, and particularly as they have so meticulously retained the capability for reprocessing through this whole period.

Senator MCCAIN. I agree. And I also believe that it will fail sometime in perhaps the not-too-distant future.

Dr. Kissinger, you mentioned the impact on Japan of this United States acquiescence to a violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Do you believe that also might have an affect on other countries, such as Iran, who are now seeking light water reactors as we are going to give to or ensure are given to North Korea? And

what affect does our acquiescence to a blatant violation of the NPT have on other nations throughout the world?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, that is, to me, the most worrisome part of the evolution. Because there is a blatant violation, at the end of which there is the provision of light water reactors and of oil, and of an agreement that grandfathers, at least for a substantial period of time, what has gone before. And I do not believe that that is an enormous discouragement to countries like Iran, aside from the fact that our bargaining position in urging China and France not to supply light water reactors to them.

Senator MCCAIN. Russia and France, I believe.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes, Russia and France not to supply light water reactors; it is not exactly strong.

Senator MCCAIN. You believe there is some connection? In other words, it bolsters the argument for the Russians and the French to——

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, it is not easy to draw a distinction between our supplying light water reactors to a violator and opposing the supply of light water reactors to some country that has, as yet, not violated.

Senator MCCAIN. Much to my astonishment, last week the Secretary of Defense said there was absolutely no connection whatsoever.

Dr. Kissinger, let me just also point out that I agree with you that we should not terminate this agreement or be the cause of its breakdown; but I am also concerned about this sort of a creeping kind of acquiescence to certain things that is taking place. We found out we are now going to provide some \$20 million to \$30 million to North Korea for different reasons.

We have found out there is now a guarantee, a letter from the President of the United States, which we did not at the time, guaranteeing that funding for the reactor—or the President would do everything in his power to guarantee the \$4 billion and the reactor, the 500,000 tons a year of oil, which now the first supply of that was provided by the United States.

Now, in today's newspaper, the United States may have to store North Korea's nuclear rods.

I am concerned that this kind of a creeping involvement in responsibility for this entire agreement is one that should give at least the American taxpayers pause, particularly in light, for example, of the recent disaster in Japan, which I think might give the Japanese some rational for not supplying \$4 billion worth of nuclear reactors.

I would appreciate your comment on that.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, essentially, if all the provisions were carried out, then, starting on the day the agreement was made, it would be not an undesirable outcome. I believe we should have stayed on the course of sanctions, and achieved the concessions as a result of our insisting on the Nonproliferation Treaty, rather than through the intermediacy of creating the impression that this was some personal disagreement.

Second, one never knows what better deal might have emerged out of such a process. And I believe it is fundamentally not desir-

able to acquiescence in the violations, even for a, say, 10-year period.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Doctor, it is good to have you before the committee again.

You identified the growth of Islamic militant fundamentalism as a major challenge. And I certainly agree with that. And I do not think we know how to cope with it.

I remember a briefing some years ago where it was estimated that the Soviet Union, by the year 2000, would be 25 percent Islamic across that whole southern tier that now, some of them are independent.

Some of the militant fundamentalists see us as the Great Satan; it is their duty to oppose us, even if they sacrifice their lives. That just opens up the gates to Heaven and so on—the murder of innocents. And yet we see these countries that sponsor some of these terrorist programs actually moving very actively toward weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, biological.

We have the trial in New York. We know what can occur from some of this.

This does not respond to normal diplomacy. How would you cope with that? What specific actions would you take to deal with that?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I do not pretend that I have detailed answers to every danger that I can foresee. I think that first it is a question of attitude. I keep reading that some people, either in the government or close to the administration, are of the view that we should improve the dialogue with the fundamentalists in Algeria and elsewhere.

I believe that the practical result of this is to undermine the moderates, and it will do nothing for us with the fundamentalists, who are dedicated to overthrowing Western values and Western institutions, and who have a set of principles that are almost incomprehensible to us, like these suicide bombers.

Now, with respect to countries that assist terrorism, I believe that extremely tough sanctions are in order, and that if it can be shown that there are headquarters of terrorist groups, that then that should be incompatible with normal relations with the United States.

Senator GLENN. Well, I do not think anybody knows really how to deal with that thing.

Dr. KISSINGER. Nobody knows how to deal with it; you are right.

Senator GLENN. Now, a different area. You indicate U.S. forces should only be used where there are American national security interests. Do you consider humanitarian efforts to be in our interest? We come from a Judeo-Christian background—most of our country at least—where we want to help people. We see a million people starving in Somalia, we want to go help. We want to do the same thing in Rwanda. We want to do the same thing other places.

Would you eliminate those, or do you include those in your American national security interests?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, in Somalia, I strongly supported humanitarian relief efforts, and having American organizations help dis-

tribute food. I have very serious questions about using American combat troops to distribute food unless there is an immediate emergency say, if there is an earthquake disaster or a tidal wave in Bangladesh, or something of that kind.

I can understand making American personnel available for a very limited period of time, but in conditions where, in order to distribute the food, one has to shoot one's way in, I think I would be very, very reluctant to do that.

Senator GLENN. I think to our credit that we saved probably a million lives in Somalia. But where it went awry was when we changed directions under the United Nations and supported that which was a whole different effort.

Dr. KISSINGER. If we had pulled out, say, in March. We went in in December. If we had pulled out in March, before we escalated the objective, I would have thought it was at the margin, but a useful exercise.

Senator GLENN. You say that if we include some of the new nations in NATO, that we should not have troops stationed in those new nations. Does that not sort of make a second-class citizenship for those people?

We are including them because supposedly there may be some threat. They see a desire to be included in NATO for their own stability and their own protection, yet we are saying that even though something would develop along your borders that looks very threatening, we would have a policy of not putting troops in there.

Is that not sort of a second-class or associate membership that they are not going to want?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, of course, if there were an actual threat, that situation would change. But one has to look at the fact that the NATO forces are now not being deployed along established lines of the Cold War anyway. The NATO forces are becoming much more intervention forces—at least the American forces are becoming a strategic reserve for rapid intervention, and, in any case, should not be deployed in a line, wherever one draws the demarcation line—and the German forces would be fairly close.

So I do not think that this is an insuperable problem, together with prepositioning equipment and exercises that could be taken.

Senator GLENN. Thank you for your comments.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.

The Senator from Texas.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to say thank you very much for coming. I am sorry I am going to have to leave after my questions. But I think that you have put a lot of our dilemma into context, and we appreciate it and I hope you will continue to do that.

I have two questions. The first, I would like to follow up on Senator Glenn and Senator Levin's comments with regard to the United Nations. It is very difficult to see what has happened with the United Nations, particularly in Somalia, where it seems that the United Nations changed the policy there and turned it from peace-keeping into nationbuilding. And our troops were there on the line. And I, for one, believe that we did not take the steps necessary to override that United Nations policy change.

How would you advise us in Congress to put the United Nations in context for its very important mission, able to do peacekeeping where there is a peace treaty, but not to let it encroach on our use of force or encroach on NATO, which has a very different mission?

Dr. KISSINGER. I must say, to some extent, in the defense of the United Nations, they did not make us extend our objectives in Somalia; we did it ourselves. You can find many statements by our United Nations Ambassador and others that list the extension of the objective as a desirable goal. The question really is whether the United Nations use of force is more responsible than the American exercise of force.

And many of the people who believe in multilateral solutions are of the view that a United Nations mandate is morally more trustworthy than a national mandate. But, on Somalia, it was not the United Nations that made us extend our mandate; we did it as an American initiative.

As a general proposition, I do not believe that American lives should be risked without, in the first instance, being able to demonstrate why it concerns the families whose sons and daughters would be at risk. Of course, it is always desirable to have other nations support us. And a wise application of American national interest would take into account the general objectives.

But, in the first instance, if one cannot demonstrate to the families concerned why their sons and daughters' lives are at risk, I do not believe American forces should be used. That is the principal objective. One starts with that and builds on it.

Second, as a general proposition, American forces should be under American command. And what the United Nations tends to build into it, which is a series of safeguards and a series of individual decisions, may be compatible with peacekeeping. It is generally not compatible with fast-moving combat situations or with peace-making.

And I would make a sharp distinction there.

Senator HUTCHISON. I agree with you totally on your standard for the use of our military. I think there is a difference between a United States interest and a United States security interest. But what I am asking is how would you define the role of the United Nations and keep us from having the encroachment that we did in Somalia, whether it was the administration's fault or Congress for not realizing it. Where do you think the line should be drawn on United Nations missions adopted by us and helped by us, but then putting parameters around those missions so that we do not fall into the use of our troops when we are not in control?

Dr. KISSINGER. As a fundamental proposition, the United Nations can perform many useful and indispensable diplomatic functions, and many humanitarian and technical functions. I do not believe that military operations ought, as a general proposition, to be conducted by the United Nations.

Now, I make a distinction here between something like the Gulf war, which was largely an American and allied operation or the Korean war, for which we got United Nations consensus, from going to the Security Council and agreeing to participate in military operations about which we are at least not absolutely sure.

And I, as a general proposition, do not favor United Nations peacemaking operations.

Senator HUTCHISON. So you would basically back off from United Nations troops doing peacekeeping missions in a military atmosphere?

Dr. KISSINGER. When there is an agreement—an international agreement that is accepted by all the parties, and one needs some way of policing it so that what the peacekeepers do is make a factual determination, but do not have to enforce it primarily, I think the United Nations can play a useful role.

When the issue is open, or the outcome is open, as in Bosnia, and the United Nations is asked to engage in a series of military operations, then I think it becomes untenable because the United Nations will always want to control every last step, and the military necessities are really quite fluid. And I do not believe we should be involved in peacemaking.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you very much.

Senator WARNER. Senator Coats.

Senator COATS. Dr. Kissinger, thank you for your always insightful testimony.

I wonder if I could just tag onto an issue we have been discussing relative to the situation in Russia. I appreciate your thoughts on that, and you discussed it before. Do you see the current situation in Russia, and particularly the involvement in Chechnya, as a serious threat to democratic reforms?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think we are making a mistake conducting foreign policy with Russia on a semi-psychiatric basis, and assessing how what we do or fail to do affects the future of one leader whom we have defined as democratic.

The evolution of Russia, which has such a different history from ours, is very uncertain. I look at what was done in Chechnya as classic Russian imperialist reaction. This is what a czar would have done and what a Soviet leader would have done.

Even if you say Chechnya is part of Russia, the brutality with which it was suppressed tells us something about the nature of the system. I cannot believe that an American President would permit shelling an open city of Americans.

Now, we have business with Russia. I can respect the need to continue to conduct business with Russia. I just do not want to have it put as if one goal in Moscow was domestic policy.

I believe that the trends in Russia at this moment are not in a pluralistic direction, and that the existing Government of Russia is appealing to the nationalist, and therefore imperialist, elements.

Senator COATS. We have not really discussed Iran. They have been fairly quiet for the last 4 or 5 years. But could you just give us a brief assessment on the situation in Iran, where they are going and what influence they might play in the future in the Middle East?

Dr. KISSINGER. I talked to one of the key people in the Bush administration only recently, and asked him this question, of what he knew. And he said, you know, when he was in office, every month he asked for an assessment of this question and he never could get a straight answer, because apparently we did not know very much. I do not know whether our knowledge has increased.

From what I can learn, my impression is that Rafsanjani is in the process of being replaced by more radical elements, not that I saw any great signs of conciliation even from Rafsanjani.

Senator COATS. I would assume you would see that as a potentially serious problem?

Dr. KISSINGER. Iran and Islamic fundamentalism stands for the undermining of the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and all the moderate regimes, and certainly of all the pro-Western regimes in the area. That is the objective thrust of their policy.

Senator COATS. Could you speak to the Israeli-Syria peace attempts, and particularly the equation of stationing U.S. troops on the Golan as a condition of that agreement?

Dr. KISSINGER. I will tell you exactly what I have said to my Israeli friends. I told them that if I am asked before an agreement is made, I will say I am not in favor of it. If I am asked after an agreement is made that includes American troops in the Golan as an element, I will swallow it.

I know that may sound like a weaseling answer.

If an agreement is already made, I think it should be carried out. I understand why Rabin, whom I greatly appreciate, who I think is one of the outstanding leaders that I have known, why he wants this as reassurance to his own public. And I have great compassion for that.

And, in the end, I might acquiescence in it. I would feel happier if an agreement were made that did not include this.

Senator COATS. You would swallow it, but it would be a difficult swallow?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes.

Senator COATS. Do you view that stationing of U.S. troops at the Golan Heights in the American national security interest?

Dr. KISSINGER. If you would stretch it to say that we are trying to prevent another Middle East war. I would prefer it if American forces were not involved in every determination of every incident that may occur there.

And I notice that an agreement that was negotiated in 1974 on the Golan Heights has been meticulously observed by the Syrians without the presence of American forces.

Senator COATS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator. Senator Santorum.

Senator SANTORUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. KISSINGER. But I do want to say that I have great sympathy for the way Prime Minister Rabin is conducting a heartbreaking negotiation.

Senator SANTORUM. Dr. Kissinger, I just wanted to follow up on Senator Coats' question. My question is: What mission would you foresee American troops playing on the Golan if in fact they were deployed? What possible mission could they perform?

Dr. KISSINGER. I have not seen the actual proposal. My understanding is that their role would be strictly peacekeeping and not peace-enforcing and that they should act as a guarantee that the disarmament provisions are being maintained.

My concern is they are awfully close to a lot of desperate people, much more so than in the Sinai.

Senator SANTORUM. Do you see this as a mission that is solely an American mission to perform, or could it be performed by other peacekeeping troops?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, the problem is—and I have sympathy for the Israeli position—they do not trust many of the potential candidates to be fair-minded even in keeping a record of whether the peace is being maintained.

Senator SANTORUM. Let me jump to another subject—my final question—and that is your comments on NATO with respect to the entry into NATO of such countries as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, and your support of that.

Could you provide any more detail as to a time line for such entry and any conditions, other than you mentioned, such as not placing troops in any of those countries, that you would have upon entry of those countries into NATO?

Dr. KISSINGER. In my view, the current administration policy confuses the issue. They say it is subject to study, that expansion is open, that anybody can apply. And, therefore, you really do not know whether they are talking about the Partnership for Peace including all the successors of the Soviet Union or NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe.

I believe that the principle ought to be settled quickly. There is nothing to be learned by a study. We know exactly what the issues are. What it needs is a decision.

I would make the decision fairly quickly—quickly, not just fairly quickly.

The implementation of it, of what forces you move, when, can be extended over a period of time. But every major NATO decision has required American leadership. It was never our practice to say, "Let us see what you all think," which will be vitiated by the fact that so many of these countries are afraid that if they get out in front, we will pull out the rug from under them.

So until there is a clear-cut American position, this is an issue that will not get settled.

Senator SANTORUM. And you believe the American position should be to let them in, and you think we should decide this immediately?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think we should recommend it immediately.

Senator SANTORUM. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

Senator WARNER. Senator Kempthorne.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I would ask that my opening statement be made part of the record.

Senator WARNER. Without objection.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Dr. Kissinger, I think it is an honor to have you testifying before this committee.

The first question I would like to ask you really is a bit of a follow-up to what Senator Cohen was asking. Should Congress continue to support the Nunn-Lugar program to dismantle and secure Russia's excess nuclear weapons regardless of that country's behavior in places such as Chechnya?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, it depends whether you consider this an aid program or a facilitating program. As a general proposition, I would make aid programs dependent on Russian behavior. And I probably would continue on the Nunn-Lugar road.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. And you had mentioned that we should make strong statements perhaps condemning the actions in Chechnya. But what else can we do besides firm statements, and should we?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I think we have to, on a number of these issues, we should make it clear to Russia that it is paying a price in political relationships.

Now, Chechnya is a different issue, from a legal point of view, from the presence of Russian troops, say, in Georgia. Because Chechnya is recognized by us as a part of Russia. And while it has all the earmarks of a colonial war, at a minimum, it is from a legal point of view not something on which we have normally taken an international position. But we can and should take a human rights position.

And I found it painful to read the statements that, in effect, supported both the action and the general attitude of Russia in Chechnya.

With respect to Russian troops in the former Republics of the Soviet Union, I would think our foreign policy, our aid and other measures, should be related to Russia observing norms of international conduct.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. All right. Thank you.

How do you see the value of nuclear weapons in the next 10 to 20 years? Have these weapons lost their value, or are they still the foundation of U.S. security?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, they are certainly the foundations of American security in any global confrontational sense.

With respect to the local issues in which we may be involved, we have meticulously refrained in the past from using nuclear weapons. And I can foresee no circumstances in which we are likely to use them or should use them in the future.

On the other hand, it seems to me also likely that nuclear weapons will spread to more and more countries, and that the best we can do, even though we should try to arrest it, our efforts will probably be largely to slow it down. Therefore, I believe that we have to keep open the options of missile defense in our own strategy, initially on a territorial basis, but, in the long run, even on a continental basis. Because the arguments that mutual balance of terror would deter does not apply to the same extent, or at all, once nuclear weapons spread beyond a certain point.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. When you look into the future, what is the next nation or collection of nations that you see challenging the United States for military supremacy?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, not necessarily military supremacy, but one could imagine—I think it would probably be in Asia.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. And any more definition than that? Any specific countries?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I better stop here.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. All right. And, Dr. Kissinger, if you could give us one piece of advice regarding national security policies—if I were to go away from this very beneficial hearing with the one point you would like to drive home, what would that one point be?

Dr. KISSINGER. I would pick up from the point that was made early in the hearing by the Chairman and by Senator Warner and

others. The need for the United States to develop some idea comparable to the containment theory in the late-forties that can act as a guide to us in making security decisions, and hopefully will serve as the basis for a bipartisan foreign policy. Because it is too dangerous to have major fluctuations with every change of political direction.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. All right. Dr. Kissinger, thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Kempthorne follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR DIRK KEMPTHORNE

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for scheduling today's hearing with our distinguished visitor, former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger is truly one of the great national security thinkers of this century and I know the committee will benefit greatly from this hearing.

It is my hope that today's hearing will help the committee gain a better understanding of the strategy and requirements that justify our Armed Forces today. Earlier this week, the committee had a classified briefing on the proliferation threat of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. This briefing clearly showed that the world remains a very dangerous place. Countries hostile to U.S. national security interest are acquiring more and more sophisticated weapons. All of these trends demonstrate that American military forces must remain strong and ready to meet the current and future challenges to our interests. I know this hearing will serve as a major contribution to the efforts of this committee and I want to thank Dr. Kissinger for taking the time to come before our committee.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator.

Doctor, we are going to make your deadline. But I would like to ask two brief questions. First, as you know, a central issue here in the United States and particularly here in the Congress is the diversity of opinion on the unilateral lifting by the United States of the present arms embargo against Bosnia.

Do you have a view on that?

Dr. KISSINGER. I wish I had put 12 o'clock as my deadline. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. If you think that is bad, wait until the next one.

Dr. KISSINGER. About 2 years ago, I wrote an article in which I said if there were not a settlement within I think a month, or, at any rate, a short time, I would favor the unilateral lifting of the embargo. Because at that time, the Serbian forces seemed to have an extraordinary advantage.

In the present circumstances, the Bosnians have received quite a bit of arms, it would raise the issue of, first, would we then send training missions? How would these arms be allocated between Croats and Muslims, since they would have to go through Croatian territory? And how would we react to a Serbian offensive that would take place in order to forestall this re-equipment?

Unless we are able to answer those questions, I would be very uneasy about a unilateral lifting of the embargo.

Senator WARNER. And, personally, I share those views and have consistently voiced the same concerns as you have had in the last year.

Let us turn to the ABM Treaty. This is when I first had the privilege of meeting with you in 1972, when I was working on the

Incidence at Sea agreement and then had the privilege to go to Moscow when you accompanied President Nixon there in May 1972, at which time the ABM Treaty was signed.

In many ways, the treaty codified the central feature of the Cold War; that is, American and Soviet mutual vulnerability. But, in your view, have the strategic and political circumstances that led to this agreement significantly changed? And, as a consequence, should we sit down and determine what modification should be made to that treaty in light of these changed circumstances?

Dr. KISSINGER. That treaty represented two aspects. One, a codification of mutual vulnerability; and, second, a recognition that the Congress was going to cancel our ABM program anyway. So we had to trade it in while there was still something to be achieved for it.

I am being very frank.

If we could have had our own way, we would probably have preferred the original ABM program which we put forward, which was not so much aimed at the Soviet Union—although it would have raised the threshold even for Soviet Union—but would have made it much more difficult for third countries to attack the United States.

As the years went on, I became intellectually more and more dubious about the theory of mutual vulnerability, even under the conditions of the Cold War. It seemed to me unprecedented that a nation would say it would expose its entire population, when there was some means of protecting it, as a guarantee of peace. It has never been done before.

And while it was never easy to demonstrate that a perfect defense was possible, it was possible to demonstrate that the level—the entrance prize for attacking the United States could be raised. And that if, say, at that time, the Soviet Union had to calculate that to attack two American cities it had to launch 2,000 warheads, that was a different calculation than from just launching two warheads.

So I had become quite favorable to the SDI.

Now, in the present world, first of all, I believe that those of our allies who have the technological capability will build a missile defense for their own territories, and I believe that to be generally in our interest.

In a world in which nuclear weapons are likely to spread, however reluctant we are to see this, I believe that a minimum provision for the territorial defense of the United States is necessary so that we can raise the standard of our defense as the threat increases.

It simply seems to me something that will not be explicable to the American public of why it was that when there was a technological ability for some defense it was not taken. Now, what that means in relation to specific technologies and the relation of these technologies to specific treaties and how one would go about modifying these treaties, that is a different set of issues.

But I would believe that when conditions have changed so dramatically, one should reconsider even treaties that are 20 years old.

Senator WARNER. As you know, the administration is currently having discussions with Russia with respect to a demarcation be-

tween what—and I use your words—the territorial missile systems which we call “theater,” and you said “intercontinental.”

Since that negotiating team for the United States for the ABM Treaty was under your direct supervision at that time in your position as first, National Security Advisor and then, Secretary of State, is there any record or recollection on your behalf that the subject of short-range theater systems, or as you say, territorial systems, would be covered by that treaty?

Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, of course, this is over 25 years ago or 23 years ago.

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Dr. KISSINGER. I have no recollection that theater ballistic missile defense was ever discussed, above all, because I had never heard at that time or any program for theater missile defense.

Senator WARNER. You are quite right.

Dr. KISSINGER. So it would have been weird to discuss it, and we would not have known what technology to ascribe to it.

Senator WARNER. And therefore, it is not likely—

Dr. KISSINGER. I mean, I do not know what might have gone on in the corridors. I am not conscious of ever having seen a paper that came through my office or any meeting at which that subject was discussed.

Senator WARNER. The focus was on the long-range intercontinental systems?

Dr. KISSINGER. Without any question. Those were the only systems that were in existence.

Senator WARNER. In existence.

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not think I had ever heard of a local missile defense.

Senator WARNER. And, therefore, I and others have drawn the deduction that the ABM Treaty simply does not apply to the theater systems.

I thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger. You have done the Senate and indeed this committee a great service by taking of your valuable time to come here today, to lay a foundation on which we can get together and devise our defense bill for this fiscal year.

Have a safe journey back to your wife and family.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1995

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Cohen, McCain, Lott, Coats, Nunn, and Robb.

Armed Services Committee staff members present: Richard L. Reynard, staff director; George W. Lauffer, deputy staff director; and Christine K. Cimko, press secretary.

Professional staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, Richard D. Finn, Jr., Stephen L. Madey, Jr., Thomas G. Moore, Joseph G. Pallone, Steven C. Saulnier, and Eric H. Thoemmes.

Minority staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, minority staff director; Andrew S. Effron, minority counsel; Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; John W. Douglass, William E. Hoehn, Jr., and Michael J. McCord, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Pamela L. Farrell, Shelley G. Lauffer, Kathleen M. Paralusz, and Deasy Wagner.

Committee members' assistants present: Grayson F. Winterling and Judith A. Ansley, assistants to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Samuel D. Adcock, assistant to Senator Lott; Richard F. Schwab, assistant to Senator Coats; Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith; George K. Johnson, assistant to Senator Hutchison; Matthew Hay, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Patricia L. Stolnacker, assistant to Senator Santorum; Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; David A. Lewis, assistant to Senator Levin; Patricia J. Buckheit and Suzanne M. McKenna, and John P. Stevens, assistants to Senator Glenn; C. Richard D'Amato, Terrence E. Sauvain, and Lisa W. Tuite, assistants to Senator Byrd; John F. Lilley, assistant to Senator Lieberman; and Randall A. Schieber, assistant to Senator Bryan.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND, CHAIRMAN

Chairman THURMOND. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets today to receive testimony on U.S. national security strategy. Last week the committee conducted a hearing on the foundations of national security strategy. Today's hearing builds upon this background by addressing the application of na-

tional security strategy for purposes of defining military strategy and conducting force planning.

Today we will explore the linkages between national security strategy and defense planning and budgeting. In this context, we have asked our witnesses to assess the extent to which the Department of Defense's Bottom-Up Review was influenced by a clear and coherent national security strategy.

We will first hear from Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz, Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, and the former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Next we will hear from Dr. Dov S. Zakheim, Chief Executive Officer of System Planning Corporation International, and former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Planning and Resources.

Finally, we will hear from Dr. Hans Binnendijk, if I pronounced that right, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and former Principal Deputy Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff.

We would ask our witnesses to keep their opening remarks brief and to submit any written statement they may have for the record. We thank you for appearing today and look forward to your testimony.

Chairman THURMOND. Now, to give each member an opportunity to make a statement on the subject of the hearing, we will extend the time for questions by 2 minutes, and that will give each member a chance to make a statement at that time.

Since Dr. Wolfowitz is not here yet, we will take the second witness then. I believe the second witness is here, isn't he?

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Yes, I am, sir.

Chairman THURMOND. I have already called your name. How do you pronounce your name?

Dr. ZAKHEIM. It is Zakheim. You were right on.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you very much. All right, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. DOV S. ZAKHEIM, PH.D., CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, SYSTEM PLANNING CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee. The issues you are addressing are critical not only to the nature of our current defense program, but equally, if not more important, they could have a major impact on our national security posture well into the next century.

Reminiscing about the formulation of NSC-68, the document that codified our post-war containment policy, Paul Nitze, one of its principal authors, noted that after the war the majority American view originally had favored a three-point policy. The first was support of the fledgling United Nations. The second was collaboration with Stalin and his associates, and the third was to rely on the British empire to deal with the array of political troubles that was plaguing the post-war world, including the communist threat to southeastern Europe.

These assumptions underpinned a massive American demobilization of 12 million people under arms. They were planned to be replaced by standing forces about one-tenth as large. In addition,

post-war budget levels were determined on what was called a residual basis. First we committed ourselves to paying the national debt, then domestic programs, then foreign aid, and what was left was for the defense top line. In the latter part of the 1940s, that level was around \$14 billion which is equivalent to about \$100 billion today.

But by 1950 when NSC-68 was finally approved, all the assumptions that governed our posture had collapsed. The U.N. proved unworkable. The Soviets proved to be a hostile confrontational nuclear power. Britain was financially strapped and unable to act as our surrogate in Greece and elsewhere. War had begun in Korea, and we no longer treated the defense budget as some kind of residual. Spending in fiscal year 1952 stood at the 1995 equivalent of \$410 billion.

Now, about 40 years have passed and once again it seems that what goes around comes around. In the aftermath of the Cold War, we undertook a drawdown of our forces and reductions in our defense budgets, and they have gone on relentlessly in the first half of the Clinton administration. Once again defense was initially viewed by the incoming administration as essentially a residual expenditure. Budget levels were set and then a force plan called the Bottom-Up Review was developed to fit within those levels. There was no articulated strategy until July 1994, nearly a half year—actually closer to a year—after the BUR was published, and the DOD virtually immediately fell short of the force level objectives outlined in its own review.

Now, given these circumstances, we shouldn't come down too hard on the DOD people who actually authored the BUR. They did as well as might have been expected in the absence of a clear policy framework, which historically has been the responsibility of the White House, and under stringent fiscal guidance. But that does not matter. The BUR is a flawed document and so is the strategy it purports to support.

Now, this strategy, the so-called "engagement and enlargement," like that of the first Truman administration a half century ago, downplays the importance of military defense, blends it into an overall security posture that gives equal weight to trade concerns, political support for democracy, and continued cooperation within the U.N. framework. Once again, collaboration with Russia—now it is Yeltsin, not Stalin—dominates the State Department's foreign policy concerns. Once again, we look to our allies, the French as well as the British, to solve thorny problems in southeastern Europe.

So, to the extent that there is a coherent American strategy, it appears to be one of sanguine multilateralism. The United States is in effect one link, admittedly a large one, in a circular chain of international collective security, which is defined in terms well beyond the military sphere. Of course, once you lose one of the links, the entire chain breaks apart.

Moreover, the strategy itself has been overtaken by events. Whatever the lip service that is being paid to non-military aspects of security, the fact is that the administration has pursued an extremely activist military deployment policy. It has undertaken some 13 new operations since taking office and has continued with

others initiated during the Bush administration. Some of them, like Macedonia and Haiti, are open-ended.

In addition, the administration itself has rethought the degree of its commitment to the U.N. operations, but it has not substituted a national security policy. It still maintains ongoing and extensive commitments and has opened the door for more of them.

The force mandated by the Bottom-Up Review would require the United States to devote not less than 4.25 percent of our annual gross domestic product to defense on a steady-state basis. The current defense budget projections point to less than 3 percent of GDP by the century's end. There are lots of estimates on the shortfall. Ours is about \$177 billion through the year 2000, and by the year 2015 we will have a force that is about two-thirds that of the BUR.

One cannot deal with the shortfall without first looking at the overall process of defense needs, however, and that means going back to first principles, developing an overall national security policy and strategy and only then developing our requirements for military forces. The strategy simply does not give the guidance essential for proper force planning and for the budgeting to support it.

So, what are we supposed to do? We do not have a Soviet threat anymore. That was the analytical panacea that gave the planners and programmers a dominating case and let them assume that everything else fit under it. But we now have to look quite differently, not at just what it is we want to protect against, but at what it is we want to protect. In the absence of a threat, we have to protect those things that may be threatened from whomever or wherever.

Obviously our primary objective is the protection of our territory, citizens, and interests, but what is less obvious, even after the Cold War—it is still valid though—that we protect all three by containing potential threats as far from our territory as possible. That means forward defense. To do that, we need allies and friends worldwide, and to do that, in turn, we have to have them view our defense as integral to theirs, and we have to view their defense as integral to ours. We cannot expect them to die for us if we are not prepared to shed blood for them.

At the same time, however, history has shown that we cannot rely on our allies to support us consistently every time we see our interests threatened. In addition, we have to recognize that in many ways we have become the force of last resort in the free world. It is unlikely that the British and the French could have shed the military capabilities they had if they did not have us to rely on.

We therefore have to recast our strategy from one that places us as a large link in this multi-national chain to really be at the hub of the wheel to which we contribute some of the spokes. Different allies can contribute different spokes at different times, but we remain there. And if nobody contributes, the wheel might wobble a little bit, but it will not fall because some of the spokes are our own.

This approach is a logical extension to our post-war leadership. We are the world's only super power. We have special responsibilities that are greater than those of other states. So, adding up the

budgets of the world and saying, "My God, we spend more than the rest of the world put together," is beside the point because we have interests worldwide that can be threatened simultaneously in a way that is simply different from those of other countries. The mindless counting up of numbers really does not get to the nub of the matter. We cannot sink our heads into the warm sands of multilateralism because we have to face the cold waves of international reality.

If we are going to maintain a force structure that permits us to retain our historic role as the leader of ad hoc coalitions that are going to change at different times, we must, to the greatest extent possible, incorporate into that structure the maximum degree of flexibility it can afford us. We must make sure that we do not fritter away unique capabilities, wherever they might be, ground, air, sea, or space, that no other friendly country can provide.

That flexibility applies to both the strategic and general purpose realm. We continue to have uncertain relationships with Russia and China, and there can be no question of relinquishing our nuclear deterrent except within the structured framework of agreements such as START II. It must be recognized that only the former Soviet states are involved in START, however, other states like Iran are not at all involved and pose potential threats possibly even within this century and certainly within the next 10 to 15 years.

Flexibility also has to be the watchword for structuring our general purpose forces. We cannot predict from where threats are going to come, and in fact, the Bottom-Up Review recognized this uncertainty. It postulated a force required to defeat another threat in the Persian Gulf, as well as an attack on South Korea from the North. The problem, though, was that it postulated what it called "near simultaneity" for the two conflicts, and it never really said what "near" meant. Many of the assumptions in the BUR, such as the adequacy of lift, the availability of bombers, the acquisition of new precise munitions, such as TSSAM (no longer with us), and the readiness of our forces quickly fell by the wayside.

The very force that the BUR postulated appears as hollow in terms of overall capability as it is in the more widely understood sense of material and personnel readiness. Acquisition is simply not keeping pace with the requirement for numbers and capabilities of forces that the BUR itself specifies.

The administration has said it anticipates increased funding for acquisition nearer to the end of the century. But everyone here knows that out-years have very little meaning in the world of defense budgeting. In addition, the recent pronouncements about base closure deferrals are going to further complicate our efforts to find more monies for people and weapon systems in the late 1990s and early 21st century. At bottom, therefore, the BUR, which is poorly linked to a strategy that is itself of dubious validity, is unaffordable, unrealistic, and impractical.

Can we develop a flexible force? Surely we can do it, but it is going to require major refocusing both of our efforts and of the budget dollars that underpin the programs. Given our increasing emphasis on minimizing casualties, early response to crises will be critical. We have to deter hostilities before they start or contain

them if they have begun. We need to ask ourselves whether our land forces are appropriately structured for rapid responses to distant contingencies, wherever they might be, in the Gulf for example, or Korea, or southeastern Europe. Let me give you a few examples and then I will close, Mr. Chairman.

We are acquiring a new airlifter, the C-17. It only carries one M-1 tank at a time. Should we size our airlift to compensate for the heavy weight and larger volume of our tanks, or should we redesign our armored forces so as to maximize the efficiency of the airlifters we acquire? It appears that the latter is more efficient and less costly an alternative to take.

Together with the Air Force, the Army has to look at the role of rotary wing forces for close air support in light of the seeming fate of the Comanche, which appears to be the latest in a series of Army light helicopter developments that failed to materialize. At issue here is not just the decades-old debate over the relative merits of Army helicopters and Air Force fixed wing, but also the place of systems such as ATACMS in our overall scheme for prosecuting operations on the battlefield. To some extent this issue could be considered one confined to the matter of roles and missions. On the other hand, without a larger strategic context, it is difficult to see how any conclusion about roles and missions can be truly meaningful.

We have to look closely at how we employ our Reserves. Perhaps General Sullivan's idea of using reserves for the multinational force in the Sinai is one that should be expanded upon.

In considering the future capabilities of our land forces, we have to bear in mind that they face a ballistic missile threat, and that they only received a small taste of that threat in the Gulf War. But we know that wherever we have interests and allies, there we face potential theater ballistic threats as well. We have to develop our TMD programs forcefully and we should not fetter them with prior international arrangements that did not address those threats in the first place. We have to incorporate all manner of responses to those threats, by land if possible, by sea if appropriate.

Speaking of the sea, geography has not changed, and the role of sea power as a vehicle for pursuing military operations independent of land bases remains undiminished. We have to ask ourselves whether we can better structure our naval forces. They too face budget problems. We cannot leave our people at sea permanently, but we have to be in the three great oceans. For the time being, large deck carriers seem to be a necessity. For the future, perhaps we can look at massing equivalent naval air power on smaller decks. Surface forces have attained an increasing ability to launch fire power as well, and we should not neglect those forces.

Carrier aviation is one of several means to bring air power to bear on distant battlefields. If bases are available, land-based tactical aviation is obviously more efficient, and if they are not, there is a growing place for long range conventional bomber capability.

The tradeoff is not between naval and land-based tactical aviation, however. It is not even between naval aviation and long range bombers. Long range bombers cannot match the flexibility and staying power that carrier-based aviation provides. They are an important supplement to carrier forces, not a replacement for them.

In my view, the choice is one of the kind of land-based aviation we seek in order to supplement what only naval forces can provide, namely, in-theater air power independent of bases. We are not going to be able to afford to buy both bombers and fighters for the next generation in the near term. We are going to have to make a choice between them.

These few statements about force choices were not meant to be a comprehensive discussion. Instead they were intended to illustrate the necessary linkage between strategy and the choices we make regarding our force posture.

The challenge that super power status imposes for the United States is a difficult one. Our resources are scarce and are required for many domestic ills as well. Unless we take a clear look at our role on the international stage and formulate a strategy that corresponds to that role, we will be unable not only to structure forces appropriate to our needs, but also to organize them in the most efficient way possible. As the BUR experience indicates, there is only so much the defense planners can do on their own. The leadership on policy and strategy must come from this side of the river as it did when Paul Nitze and his colleagues formulated a strategy that served this country well for four decades and won us a war without resort to worldwide bloodshed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Zakheim follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DOV S. ZAKHEIM

Mr. Chairman, Senator Nunn, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee. The issues you are addressing are critical not only to the nature of our current defense program, but equally important, could have a signal impact on our national security posture well into the next century.

Reminiscing about the formulation of NSC-68, which codified America's post-war containment policy, Paul Nitze, one of its principal authors, noted that in the war's immediate aftermath, the majority U.S. view originally had favored a three point policy. The first was support of the fledgling United Nations organization. The second was collaboration with Stalin and his associates. As Nitze put it, "This was seen as a prerequisite for the smooth and successful operation of the United Nations and its organs."¹ The third was to rely on the British Empire to deal with the array of political troubles plaguing the post-war world, including the Communist threat to southeastern Europe.

These assumptions underpinned a massive American demobilization of America's 12 million people under arms, with plans for them to be replaced by standing forces about one-tenth as large. In addition, post-war budget levels were determined on a "residual basis." After planned commitments for paying the national debt, for domestic programs, and for foreign aid (especially after 1947) were accounted for, defense was allocated its "top line." In the latter part of the 1940s, that level hovered around the \$14 billion mark, the equivalent of about \$100 billion today.

By 1950, when NSC-68 was finally approved, all three assumptions governing America's national security posture had collapsed. The United Nations proved unworkable; the Soviet Union bared its fangs as a hostile, confrontational, nuclear power; Britain was financially and psychologically unable to act as America's surrogate in Greece and elsewhere. War had begun in Korea; the United States no longer treated the defense budget as residual. Spending for fiscal year 1952 stood at the 1995 equivalent of \$410 billion.

Over 40 years have passed, and once again it appears that "what goes around comes around." In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States undertook a drawdown of its forces, and reductions in its defense budgets, which have continued relentlessly through the first half of the Clinton administration. Once again, defense was initially viewed by the incoming administration as essentially a "residual" ex-

¹Paul H. Nitze, "The Grand Strategy of NSC-68," in James C. Gaston, ed. *Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process* (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1992), p. 25.

penditure. Budget levels were set, and then a force plan, the Bottom-Up Review, was developed to fit within those levels. There was no articulated strategy until July 1994, nearly a year after the BUR was published, and the Department of Defense virtually immediately fell short of the force-level objectives outlined in its own review.

Given these circumstances, one should not come down too hard on the Defense Department's authors of the Bottom-Up Review. They did as well as might have been expected in the absence of a clear policy framework—which historically has been the responsibility of the White House—and under stringent fiscal guidance. Whatever the circumstances, however, the BUR is a flawed document, and so is that strategy that it now purports to support.

The strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement," like that of the first Truman administration a half century ago, downplays the importance of military defense, blending it into an overall security posture that gives equal weight to trade concerns, political support for democracy, and continued cooperation within the U.N. framework. Once again, collaboration with Russia, and particularly with Boris Yeltsin, dominates the State Department's foreign policy concerns. Once again, the United States looks to its allies—France as well as Britain—to solve thorny problems in southeastern Europe.

To the extent that there is a coherent American strategy, therefore, it appears to be one of sanguine multilateralism. The United States is in effect but one link, albeit a very large one, in a circular chain of international collective security, which is defined in terms well beyond the military sphere.

Such an approach courts two interrelated dangers, however. First, economic strength does not necessarily correlate either with the political will to use force, or with force itself. Thus, when force is required, a chain built on strength other than military strength and the willingness to employ it will surely fall apart as weaker links break away. The second danger is that the chain has no firm anchor. In the absence of clear leadership and direction, such as that offered by the United States in the past, the chain's cohesion will always be suspect—as was amply demonstrated in Somalia and now again in Bosnia.

Moreover, the strategy itself has been overtaken by events. Whatever the lip-service being paid to non-military aspects of security, is an undeniable fact that the Clinton administration has pursued an extremely activist military deployment policy. It has undertaken some 13 new operations since taking office, and has continued with others initiated during the Bush administration. Some of those operations, such as the deployment of forces to Macedonia and to Haiti, are open ended. These commitments have been grafted onto older ad-hoc ones, such as the no-fly zones in Iraq, as well as onto long standing alliances and friendships, which, for good reasons, we continue to value and maintain.

In addition, the administration itself has rethought the degree of its commitment to U.N. operations, without, however, developing a substitute national security policy. It has maintained its ongoing and extensive commitments, and kept the door open for others, thereby compounding current and budgetary pressures that in any event threaten the viability of our force posture over the longer term.

The force mandated by the Bottom-Up Review would require the United States to devote not less than 4.25 percent of our annual gross domestic product to defense on a steady-state basis. Yet our current defense budget projections point to less than 3 percent of GDP being devoted to defense by century's end. Estimates of the shortfall vary widely: our own calculations postulate a shortfall of no less than \$177 billion through the year 2000. By the year 2015 we are likely to field a force that is roughly two-thirds that postulated in the BUR. But dealing with the shortfall should be the final step in the process of meeting defense needs.

We must go back to first principles, develop an overall national security policy and strategy, and from them develop our requirements for military forces. The current strategy, such as it is, simply does not provide the guidance that is essential both for proper force planning, and for the budgeting to support it.

How then are we to relate strategy to our force posture? In the past, the Soviet threat was an analytical panacea. It afforded planners and programmers what is called a "dominating case." Forces geared to a worldwide war with the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies were assumed to be generally adequate for what were termed "lesser included contingencies", such as Vietnam, and, indeed, the Gulf War. Now there is no Soviet threat, nor any other imminent threat. We must assess force requirements differently, looking at what it is we wish to protect, rather than what it is we wish to protect against.

Our primary objective remains the protection of our territory, our citizens, and our interests. That is a truism. But what is less obvious, but still valid even after the Cold War, is that we best protect all three by containing any potential threats

as far from the United States as possible. We therefore need the ability to operate in a "forward manner" and to do so most effectively and efficiently we need allies and friends worldwide. Yet to maintain alliance relationships and friendships—to have others view our defense as integral to their own, requires us to view their defense as integral to ours. If we are not prepared to shed blood and resources for their defenses, why should they be prepared to do so for ours?

At the same time, history has demonstrated that we cannot rely on our allies to support us consistently every time we see our interests threatened. When we organized Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990–91, Britain and France were perhaps our most steadfast military allies. Yet when we bombed Tripoli in 1982, France would not let us cross her airspace, though Britain permitted us to deploy our aircraft from her territory. Indeed, when we sought to resupply Israel in 1973, neither Britain nor France were prepared to support our airlift operations to the Mideast.

Moreover, we must also recognize that we have become the force of last resort in the free world. Other states were always able to rely on the United States for support. Indeed, it was the availability of such support, particularly for long distance operations, that allowed Britain and France to shed military capabilities that underpinned their worldwide empires. It was America that provided lift for French troops in Zaire in the late seventies, America that offered material and other support for Britain during the 1982 South Atlantic war. On whom would the United States rely?

We must therefore recast our strategy from one that places us as a large link in a multinational chain to one that continues to place us at the hub of a wheel to which we also contribute several spokes. Ideally, we would hope to work as the leader of large permanent coalitions, with our allies acting as additional spokes that give the wheel greater stability. But we can also function with ad hoc coalitions, with different allies acting as those spokes at different times. And, *in extremis*, we could act on our own. The wheel might wobble a bit, but it would not fall.

Such an approach is a logical extension of our post-war leadership. It recognizes that we are the world's only superpower, with worldwide interests that generate special responsibilities greater than those of other states. It is mindless to tot up the total defense expenditures of any group of countries, or even of all countries, and compare them to our own. No other state has the far flung interests we have—vital interests, to which we commit our lives. No other state can have those interests threatened simultaneously to the same degree as we could. Try as we might, we cannot sink our heads into the warm sands of multilateralism to avoid the cold waves of international reality. They will come, and we must remain prepared to face them.

Reality means recognizing the value of the long term commitments, whether through treaties or friendship, to which we remained obliged—in NATO, in the Middle East, East Asia and in our own hemisphere. Reality means being cautious about taking on too many other military commitments, temporary as well as permanent, unless they too unequivocally contribute to our security and well-being as a nation. Moreover, reality also means recognizing that we already own a force structure, whose current inventory replacement value approximates \$2.7 trillion and whose effective service life will, in the main, last well into the next century. We must understand that in considering the fate of that force structure—whether and to what extent to support it, operate it, maintain it, modernize it and/or replace it—we are making decisions on the margin rather than from whole cloth.

If we indeed are to maintain a force structure that permits us to retain our historic role as a leader of ad hoc coalitions, we must to the greatest extent possible incorporate into that structure the maximum degree of flexibility that it can afford us. We must retain those elements of flexibility already in our force structure, and add to them as feasible. In that way we will remain capable of adapting to the different political and military circumstances that might confront us in a variety of currently unforeseen contingencies. In addition, we must ensure that we do not fritter away unique capabilities, on the ground, in the air, on the sea and in space, that no other friendly country will be able to provide.

The principle of flexibility applies both to the way we must relate our strategic nuclear and general purpose force capabilities, and to the specific nature of those general purpose forces. While we face no obvious major threat today, we continue to have uncertain relationships with Russia and China. Both have nuclear weapons that can reach our territory; both are continuing to modernize those weapons, and both may still go through periods of political instability followed by the accession of governments inimical to the United States. In addition, as Secretary Perry indicated in his meetings with Prime Minister Rabin, Iran appears on a trajectory to acquire a nuclear capability coupled with long range delivery systems sometime

within the next decade or so. There may be other unfriendly powers who, through purchases, or indeed theft, could also propel themselves into the nuclear arena within a decade.

There can therefore be no question of relinquishing our nuclear deterrent, except within the structured framework of agreements such as START II, to which only the former Soviet States are committed. Moreover, in addressing the threat from other States, we cannot overlook the importance of ballistic missile defense, whose purpose is not to cover America with an impregnable dome, but rather to minimize the probable effectiveness of small-scale attacks and thereby deter them in the first place.

Flexibility must likewise be the watchword for structuring our general purpose forces, precisely because we cannot predict from whence threats to our citizens, our interests or our allies might emerge. The Bottom-Up Review recognized this uncertainty, and postulated a level of force required to defeat another threat in the Persian Gulf, as well as an attack on South Korea from the north. The BUR's approach was flawed however. Its early drafts appear to have incorporated the impractical notion of winning one war while holding on in the second until reinforcements could arrive. Its final version finally postulated "near simultaneity" for the two conflicts without, however, expressly defining what "near" meant. Indeed, many of the key assumptions underlying America's ability to respond to such contingencies, such as the adequacy of lift, the availability of bombers, the acquisition of new precise munitions, such as TSSAM, and the readiness of our forces quickly fell by the wayside.

The very force that the BUR postulated appears to be as hollow in terms of overall capability as it is in the more widely understood sense of material and personnel readiness. Our acquisition PROGRAMS simply are not keeping pace with the requirement for the numbers and capabilities of forces that the BUR requires. To give but one example of such "hollowness": in his fiscal year 1980 annual report, then-Secretary Harold Brown requested 175 F-16s alone, and programmed an additional 180 for fiscal year 1981. A steady state BUR force would require annual procurement of at least 250 fixed wing aircraft. During fiscal year 1995, however, the United States procured only 87 planes, of all kinds, for all services.

The administration has stated that it anticipates increased funding for acquisition nearer to the end of the century. But "outyears" have little meaning in the real world of defense budgeting. Moreover, recent pronouncements about base closure deferrals will further complicate efforts to find more moneys for people and weapons systems in the late 1990s and early 21st century. At bottom, therefore, the BUR, poorly linked to a strategy that is itself of dubious validity, is unaffordable, unrealistic and impractical.

Is it possible to develop a flexible force, that meets the objectives of protecting our far flung interests and allies? No doubt this can be done, but it will require a major refocussing of our efforts and the budget dollars that underpin them.² Given our increasing emphasis on minimizing casualties, early response to crises will be critical: to deter hostilities before they start, or contain them if they have begun. We need to ask ourselves whether our land forces are appropriately structured for rapid responses to distant contingencies, be they in the Persian Gulf, or Korea, or southeastern Europe. The Marine Corps has begun to restructure itself as an expeditionary force for the next century. It is in the process of acquiring systems such as the V-22, whose battlefield potential has yet to be fully realized. The Army, on the other hand, has yet to demonstrate convincingly that it requires as many armored divisions as it now incorporates. It must also demonstrate that the mainstay of those divisions, and of its mechanized divisions, should remain the heavy tank force, rather than lighter tanks with more firepower, that could be airlifted more quickly than is presently possible. We are acquiring a new airlifter—the C-17. It can only carry one M-1 tank at a time. Should we size our airlift to compensate for the heavy weight and larger volume of our tanks, or should we redesign our armored vehicles so as to maximize the efficiency of the airlifters we acquire? It would appear the latter is the more efficient, less costly, route to take.

Together with the Air Force, the Army must look closely at the role of Rotary Wing forces for close air support, particularly in light of the seeming fate of the Comanche, seemingly the latest in a series of Army Light Helicopter developments that failed to materialize. At issue is not just the decades-old debate over the relative merits of Army helicopters and Air Force Fixed Wing aviation, but also of the place of systems such as ATACMS in our overall scheme for prosecuting operations on the battlefield. To some extent, this issue might be confined to the matter of

² An expanded version of this discussion will appear in the spring 1995 issue of *Orbis*, entitled "A Top-Down Plan For The Pentagon."

"roles and missions." On the other hand, without a larger strategic context, it is difficult to see how any conclusion about roles and missions can be truly meaningful.

We must also look again at how we plan to employ our Reserves. We might wish to expand to other locales General Sullivan's concept of employing Reserves for the multinational force of observers in the Sinai. Such an approach would relieve our Active forces of these duties, freeing them to train and prepare for more historic and demanding military missions. In this context we must also reconsider the extent we wish to incorporate United Nations related peacekeeping training for our Active forces. Indeed, if we are not to be subsumed in a multilateralist approach, our forces, including our Reserves, will have to focus primarily on the tasks of deterring and if necessary fighting wars under an American flag, rather than attempting to keep uncertain peace under a U.N. banner.

In considering the future capabilities of our land forces, we must also bear in mind that they face a ballistic missile threat, of which they openly received a small taste during the Gulf War. Wherever we have interests, and allies, there we face potential theater ballistic missile threats. We face them in southern Europe, we face them in both the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean. And we face them on the Korean Peninsula. We must forcefully develop our TMD programs, unfettered by prior international arrangements that did not address those threats. Moreover, we must incorporate all manner of responses to those theater based threats, by land if possible, by sea if appropriate.

Geography has not changed, and the role of seapower as a vehicle for pursuing military operations independent of land bases remains undiminished. Some may argue that our network of alliances ensures the availability of such bases. Yet what if it is a beleaguered ally that we seek to save, one that has lost the use of those very bases that we had planned to operate from?

Nevertheless we must ask ourselves whether we can better structure our naval forces, given the ongoing demands for our presence in the world's three great oceans, and the need to ensure that our sailors are not permanently away at sea. For the time being, large deck carriers seem to be a necessity; for the next decade, we must explore massing equivalent naval airpower on smaller decks. Surface forces have attained an increasing ability to launch firepower as well. We must not neglect these forces, nor their requisite numbers.

If there is any aspect of our sea based capability that may yet be subject to reduction, it is the submarine force. We must therefore ask ourselves whether, in an era of pressing demands and constraints, we can afford the luxury of artificially propping up that force in order to preserve an industrial base that otherwise would fall into disuse.

Carrier aviation is but one of several means to bring air power to bear on distant battlefields. If bases are available, land-based tactical aviation is more efficient. If they are not, there is a growing place for long range conventional bomber capability.

The choice is not between naval and land-based tactical aviation. Nor is the choice between naval aviation and long-range bombers. Land-based bombers cannot match the flexibility and staying power that carrier based aviation provides. They are an important supplement to carrier based forces, not a replacement for them.

Instead the choice is between the kind of land-based aviation we seek in order to supplement what only naval forces can provide: In-theater airpower independent of bases. We will not be able to afford both more bombers and near-term acquisition of next generation fighters. We must ask ourselves which is the more likely development: the appearance of new aircraft capabilities that can challenge the F-15 AND F-16 in the foreseeable future, or increasing uncertainties about the availability of bases currently open to our operations. Only such judgments can inform our particular weapons systems choices.

The foregoing was not meant to be a comprehensive discussion of choices among forces or weapons, instead it was intended to illustrate the necessary linkage between strategy and the choices we make regarding our force posture.

The challenge that superpower status imposes for the United States is a difficult one. Our resources are scarce and are required for our many domestic ills as well. Unless we take a clear look at our role on the international stage, and formulate a strategy that corresponds to that role, we will be unable not only to structure forces appropriate to our needs, but also to organize them in the most efficient way possible. As the experience indicates, there is only so much that defense planners can do on their own; the leadership on policy and strategy must come from this side of the river, as it did when Paul Nitze and his colleagues formulated a strategy that served this country well for four decades and won us a war without resort to world-wide bloodshed.

Thank you.

NOTE: The views represented herein are personal and are not intended to reflect those of System Planning Corporation or any other organization.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you. Dr. Binnendijk, we will be glad to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF HANS BINNENDIJK, PH.D., DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Dr. BINNENDIJK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by saying it is a real pleasure to be back up on the Hill after a 10 years' absence.

My testimony will be based in large part on the Strategic Assessment 1995, which is a document that the Institute for National Strategic Studies is releasing today. I wanted to stress at the outset that I am not appearing here as a Government witness, but in my own private capacity.

I have, Mr. Chairman, a longer statement, and I propose to summarize that longer statement and ask that the statement itself be placed in the record.

Mr. Chairman, since the United States became an independent nation, there have been five world orders in which we have lived. We are now in a transition to a sixth world order. This transition is taking a long time. We have been in it for 5 years, but the fact that we remain in transition is important because it explains why it has been so difficult for several administrations to come up with a national strategy that is sound.

The transition that we are in and its outcome will be determined in large part by what happens with the major alliances that the United States has, with what happens in Russia and China, and with what happens in the area of nuclear proliferation. But my main point is that it is very hard to develop a national strategy when you are still in a time of transition, and we could be in that transition for at least the rest of the decade.

In that context, we have to take a look at the Bottom-Up Review. I would make the point that while it can be argued that it is flawed, at least the concept of the review was demonstrated to be fairly sound last fall when, in fact, we faced two simultaneous crises. You will recall last October we were facing a problem both with North Korea over nuclear weapons and with Saddam Hussein's actions with regard to Kuwait. That is essentially the kind of dual crisis that was envisioned by the Bottom-Up Review, and I think the fact that these crises took place tends to validate the basic concept.

In our Strategic Assessment we take three different snapshots of the world, and perhaps I could share this with you very briefly and then move on to how we can derive military missions from those snapshots.

The first is a geostrategic look at the world. We start by looking at the major powers, and we conclude that this is a unique moment in history, and has been for about a half a decade, in which the major powers are cooperating by and large with one another. Most of the major powers are not building weapon systems either with the purpose of attacking one another or defending against one another. That is unique in this century with the exception of a short period in the early 1920s. That is a situation which provides maximum security for the United States, and it is unclear how long it is going to last.

The second snapshot is a political-economic look at the world, and here we have divided the world basically into three parts, but they are different from the three "worlds" that existed in the Cold War.

The first is what we might call the market democracies, and this is a group that has expanded in size since the end of the Cold War. It now includes not just the OECD countries, but it also includes parts of Central Europe, the tigers of Asia, and most of Latin America.

The second group is the transition states. These are critical states. It includes Russia, China, India, and South Africa. What happens in these states will be key to the new system as it emerges.

The third part of the world system is what we have called the troubled states. This is basically Africa and much of the Middle East. These are the failed states and the rogue states. This is where much of the trouble is coming from.

The third snapshot of the world looks at the threats coming from transnational threats. This includes refugee flows, terrorism, drugs, transnational illegal activities.

In addition to these three views of the world we must consider our changing values and interests.

With regard to values, our assessment is that values in the international system are more contradictory now than they were during the Cold War. We have several examples that I give in my written testimony, but it is not as easy, for example, to determine whether self-determination ought to be the focus of our foreign policy or the inviolability of borders.

At the same time, our vital national interests are contracting, our foreign policy concerns are expanding. In that case, we find ourselves very often engaged in situations that cannot be justified to the American people as being vital, and yet we have gotten into them because our concerns have expanded.

I would like to go through four national priorities that flow from this analysis. The most important is to keep the focus on the major powers. In that context, we need a phased approach to NATO expansion, a new strategic dialogue with Japan, an agreement with Russia on its behavior in the Newly Independent States, continued support for market-based economic reform in China, and develop-

ment of closer ties with India. These, Mr. Chairman, I think are the priorities for our national security policy.

Secondary issues include dealing with regional conflict, dealing with these transnational threats that I mentioned, and finally dealing with the failed states.

If we cannot find a global strategy which is comprehensive, it seems to me the challenge before the United States is to balance these missions. Let me go through the missions very briefly and talk about the military component of each.

Mission number one is to hedge against an emerging peer military competitor. This should be the principal long-term mission of the United States. Reform in Russia and China are not be doing that well, and we need to think out 10 or 15 years about how we begin to hedge against those potential peer competitors.

Now, how do you do that? The most important element of the defense budget in this context is the investment accounts. We have seen the investment accounts falling from 45 percent in 1986 to about 30 percent in 1996, so why is a major change over the last decade.

The investment accounts are broken down into two parts: research and development, and procurement. The research and development account remains fairly robust, but if you look out at the 5-year plan, it is projected to go down by about \$7 billion, and I think that has to be monitored very carefully to make sure that we still have the capability to develop the revolution in military affairs that is needed to deal with a potential peer competitor.

The second element is procurement, and Dr. Zakheim has mentioned this as well. There has been a massive drop in the procurement account over the past 5 years, and this is a cause for some concern. To some degree, it is understandable because we are still living with the bow wave of the purchases made in the mid-1980's and we may need to pause for a minute to see what kinds of new procurements are necessary as a result of the work being done in the revolution in military affairs. But I remain very concerned about this dramatic drop in the procurement accounts.

In 1995 we will procure six new Navy ships, 28 fighter aircraft, and no tanks. These numbers are all far below the steady state procurement rate needed to support the planned 1999 force. The concern here, Mr. Chairman, is that 10 to 15 years from now, we may face potential obsolescence, block obsolescence, on a number of fronts. We need to begin thinking now about new procurement so that we are ready for that block obsolescence in 10 to 15 years.

The second mission, Mr. Chairman, has to do with regional military conflict and the Bottom-Up Review. In our assessment, there is only a small margin for error with regard to executing the Bottom-Up Review given the force structure. If the Desert Storm force were once again deployed into the Persian Gulf, as it was in 1991, what we would have left, given the Bottom-Up Review force, is two active duty Army divisions, three active duty Air Force wings, and one Marine expeditionary force. What that means is a very heavy reliance on Reserves.

Now, that is offset to some degree by the fact that our force has been enhanced significantly since 1991, and our two most likely en-

emies, the North Koreans and the Iraqis, using the Bottom-Up Review examples, have been weakened during that period.

Finally, it tells me that we will increasingly have to rely on coalitions in the future to make the two MRC strategy work.

The third mission, Mr. Chairman, relates to counterproliferation efforts. There is some good news here. During the past 2 years, South Africa, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine have each pledged to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. The Iraqi program has been further degraded under IAEA supervision, and we have negotiated the Geneva Framework with North Korea. That framework, should it be implemented, would remove North Korea's nuclear potential within a decade. I know it is a controversial agreement, but in my view this agreement provides a process to make North Korea accountable. What is important, just as we did with the Soviets, is to verify each step. It is the process that is important and verifying that process, and at the end of the process, lies a North Korea that is not a nuclear threat.

Despite that good news on the proliferation front, there still are some 20 nations, many of whom are hostile to the United States, who are trying to develop the capability to produce weapons of mass destruction and delivery means. The May 1994 Deutsch Report looks at the requirements, and I recommend it and its conclusions to the committee. It calls for some \$400 million worth of additional counterproliferation programs.

The fourth mission that faces the United States has to do with developing cost effective responses to transnational threats. These threats are threats to our cities. It includes illegal drugs. It is increasingly international crime, illegal refugees. There is a limited role for the military in dealing with this to back up police forces, but if you talk to Gen. Barry McCaffrey in the Southern Command, you will find that he is preoccupied with many of these issues, refugees from Cuba, from Haiti, et cetera. The military will have to pay more attention to these kinds of issues in the future.

Mr. Chairman, the fifth and last mission—and I would say the lowest priority of these five—has to do with engaging selectively in failed states. This is a bipartisan problem. Of the 15 major U.N. peace operations currently underway, only 4 were initiated during the Clinton administration. Of the 27 different U.S. deployments since Desert Storm, 14 were ordered by the Bush administration. This is truly a bipartisan problem.

PDD 25, issued by this administration, laid down some fairly strict guidelines for when the United States should support these kinds of missions and when our forces should engage.

I would like to just briefly address two items in the legislation before the committee that relates to this issue. First is title IV, of H.R. 7. Title IV of that legislation would prohibit placing U.S. forces under the command or operational control of foreign nationals when those nationals are acting on behalf of the United Nations.

I have in the last few months visited our deployments both in the MFO in the Sinai and in Macedonia. In both of these cases, we have Americans under the operational control of foreign nationals. In both cases these are successful missions. In both cases they serve our national interest. Therefore, I wonder why it is necessary

certainly in Article VI situations to have the kinds of restrictions that are included here. I understand it is a certification requirement, but at least in the two cases where I have visited, I do not see this as a problem requiring legislation. It may be a problem for U.N. Article VII deployments.

Finally, Title V of the legislation is more troublesome. This has to do with U.N. assessments. If I read it correctly, our U.N. peacekeeping assessments would be offset by non-reimbursable costs to the U.S. military of U.N. peacekeeping-related operations. Looking at the numbers, it would require a massive default on the part of the United States for U.N. peace operations. These peace operations are often vital to our interests. The United Nations is engaged here in operations in Haiti, in El Salvador, on Israel's borders, in Kuwait. These are areas of vital importance to the United States. The United Nations is playing an important role to support our interests, and I think a default under those circumstances would not be wise.

So, finally to conclude, Mr. Chairman, at a time when we are looking at regional contingencies, we should not lose sight of the fact that it is the major powers and what they do in the future that will determine the nature of the international system. As we look at readiness and quality of life issues, we must also focus on long-term procurement. We have a real problem here. We need to focus on it. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Binnendijk follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HANS BINNENDIJK, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Thank you for the opportunity to share with you this morning some thoughts based in part on a report issued today by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, entitled *Strategy Assessment 1995*. You each have a copy. Permit me to emphasize that my remarks, like the report, are the product of independent university research, and do not necessarily represent the position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. I am not here as a government witness.

DEVELOPING NATIONAL STRATEGY IN TIME OF TRANSITION

Since U.S. independence, the world has known five world orders: the Napoleonic era; the Congress of Vienna and its Concert of Europe; Germany's drive for power in the second half of the 19th century; the interwar League of Nations; and the Cold War. Transitions between these previous world orders were marked by large conflicts and most transitions lasted years before a new system developed.

Today we remain in transition to a new international system, and the transition is likely to be a long one, perhaps to the end of the decade. This is because the Cold War ended, not in conflict but peacefully. The nature of the new system will be determined in large measure by the health of America's alliances with Europe and Japan, by the outcome of transitions in Russia and China, and by the rate of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Developing a new grand strategy to replace containment has proven difficult during the past 5 years precisely because the system remains in transition. This is a bipartisan problem. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations have struggled with their international vision. Even Henry Kissinger, testifying here last week, offered great advice about priorities but no grand strategy.

There is concern that the Clinton administration got it backwards, that it first decided on a budget level, then designed a force to fit the budget, and finally articulated a strategy—the strategy of engagement and enlargement. I don't see this as a serious problem. First, the new administration was faced with a tight timetable within weeks of taking office and had to make some initial budget decisions. It did so by balancing domestic and national security priorities. Second, in four key speeches, elements of the new administration's strategy emerged during the first 9 months of 1993. Secretary Aspen developed his four dangers. Secretary Christopher

laid out his six priorities. The Bottom-Up Review was developed in the context of this emerging strategy and issued after these key speeches were delivered. Third, the dual crises with Iraq and North Korea in the autumn of 1994 confirmed the validity of the two major regional conflict threat envisioned by the Bottom-Up Review. That force structuring concept may need to be amended in the coming years, but it is appropriate for the interim.

THE NATURE OF THE SLOWLY MERGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

There are at least three ways in which one might envision the emerging international system:

The first is a geo-strategic assessment of the major powers. We are in an historically unique moment of relative cooperation among the great powers: the United States, the European Union, Japan, China, Russia and perhaps India. In general, the major powers do not envision each other as current threats and are not building military establishments to either attack or defend against each other. Regional economic blocks are forming, but they are not being used by the great powers to develop closed alliances against one another. Spheres of influence exist for some of the great powers, but thus far they do not appear to be overlapping in ways that could cause conflict. And the great powers are avoiding the temptation to use cultural differences against each other. This situation provides maximum security for the United States and its allies. It has lasted for half a decade, but given transition problems in Russia and China and tensions within our alliance systems, it is unclear how much longer it will last.

A second way to assess the emerging international system is to look at political and economic orientations of individual countries. From this perspective, the world can be seen as consisting of three parts. The dominant group is the market democracies, a group much larger than the old "First World" of the Cold War. It includes not just the OECD countries, but most of Latin America, the "tigers" of East Asia, and gradually, parts of Central Europe. Then we have the transitional states, which include not just Russia, but China, India, and South Africa. The success of their transitions is crucial to the future world order. Third are the troubled states, primarily in Africa and the greater Middle East, which are falling behind the rest of the globe politically and economically and many of which are torn by rampant ethnic or religious tensions. These countries are the breeding ground for failed states and rogue states. The administration's strategy of "enlargement" is most consistent with this perspective of the world order.

A third view looks not at geo-strategic or political-economic configurations, but at transnational threats. The porousness of international borders has very positive effects: totalitarian regimes cannot last when they can no longer manage the flow of information to their people. But porous borders also mean that international crime, narcotics, disease, illegal immigrants, pollution, terrorists, and smugglers of nuclear material all pose greater threats to our national security. These all have a greater impact on the average American than what happens in Somalia.

Combining these perspectives and other trends discussed in the *Strategic Assessment*, there are grounds for both optimism and pessimism. The grounds for optimism include:

- The major powers are at peace and there are few signs of exclusive spheres of influence or economic blocs;
- Most nations aspire to democracy and the market system; and;
- The United States remains dominant militarily.

The grounds for pessimism include:

- Transitions in Russia and China show signs of instability;
- Multi-ethnic states are fragmenting violently;
- Traditional alliances are under stress;
- Transnational threats are increasingly being felt in U.S. cities; and;
- Nuclear proliferation is creating greater risks in the event of conflict.

VALUES, INTERESTS, AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

As Henry Kissinger noted before this committee last week, a decision to intervene militarily must be based on America's values and its interests. Ideally, we should intervene only when both our values and interests are fully engaged, and then we should intervene with decisive force. But the world in transition isn't always that clear.

Values in the post-Cold War era sometimes seem contradictory. For example:

- Should we support national self-determination or the inviolability of internationally recognized borders when those values clash?

— Should we stress the right to refuge or protection from disruptive levels of illegal immigration?

— Should we stress human rights at the expense of vital U.S. interests?

Similarly, our vital national interests have shrunk in the post-Cold War era while foreign policy concerns have expanded. As a result, we tend to intervene in situations that cannot be justified as vital to the United States.

Regions of vital interests to the United States include: (1) our alliances with Europe, Japan, South Korea and Australia, (2) our historic relationship with Israel and our role in the Middle East peace process, (3) our access to energy resources in the Persian Gulf, and (4) democracy and order in the trans-Caribbean Basin.

SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES

If it is too early to develop a grand strategy, we can at least suggest priorities to see us through this period of transition. Our analysis suggests four national security priorities (excluding economics).

The most important focus for our national security policy should be the major powers. That entails sustaining our key alliance systems and supporting the transition to market democracy in Russia and hopefully China. In this context, we need a phased approach to NATO expansion, a new strategic dialogue with Japan, an agreement with Russia on its behavior in the Newly Independent States, continued support for market-based economic reform in China, and development of closer ties with India. At the same time as we are working to sustain the peace among the major powers, we should hedge against the possibility that the usual pattern of world history will reassert itself in future decades, that is, that there will be tensions among some of the great powers. To this end, we should maintain such a convincing military lead as to deter any potential future peer competitor from seriously considering building up his forces to the point that he could confront the U.S. globally. To sustain our lead, the central task is to take full advantage of the "revolution in military affairs".

The second U.S. national security priority should be to deal decisively with those regional rogue states that threaten our vital interests. This includes two missions: developing the capability to win two major regional conflicts and counterproliferation efforts. Defeating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is particularly important because such weapons, in the hands of a rogue government, could endanger U.S. allies and threaten American lives.

The third priority should be dealing with transnational concerns, such as international crime, narcotics traffic, and illegal refugee flows. Although these phenomena generally do not pose a threat to the security of states, they threaten the security of our citizens. The military should develop cost-effective ways to support the law enforcement and humanitarian agencies that will have the lead on these issues. No new military equipment is required for this mission, and personnel with specialized combat skills should not be tied up for extended periods for these purposes.

The fourth priority item is peace operations to deal with failing states. This is the most common new threat but also the least likely to affect U.S. vital interests. Although peace operations appeal to U.S. national values, we should approach these cautiously because Somalia taught us that there is a high opportunity cost if we fail. In many cases, the U.S. military can provide humanitarian relief and seek to contain the conflict, as we are doing in Bosnia. Regional powers should provide the peacekeeping forces, as the Europeans are doing in Bosnia. Unless our vital interests are involved, we should not commit ourselves to long term deployments, nor should we take on responsibility for nation-building or ending age-old ethnic tensions. When our vital interests are involved, however, as I believe they are in Haiti, then a more robust U.S. involvement is warranted.

The challenge for the United States is to balance these four interests, remember their priority, and not let tight budgets or the pace of events undermine the highest priority items. There are limits to what the United States can do in the national security area and we must invest our time and resources wisely.

FROM NATIONAL PRIORITIES TO BUDGET DECISIONS

Each of the national security priorities identified in our *Strategic Assessment* has a military mission associated with it that needs to be funded. They are, in priority order:

- hedging against the emergence of a peer military competitor;
- winning major regional conflicts with rogue states;
- preventing rogue states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.
- developing cost-effective responses to transnational threats, and;
- engaging selectively and flexibly in peace operations for failed states.

The chart on the following page shows that most of the defense budget is allocated either to "investing in the future", (which is needed to hedge against the emergence of a peer competitor) or to the "current force structure" (which is needed to fight and win regional conflicts today). Both are important, for we cannot afford to mortgage our future or to create a hollow force today. Most of the funding for the last two missions tends to be on a contingency basis and is usually taken out of the operations and maintenance account.

DOD BUDGET AUTHORITY BY TITLE

[Constant Fiscal Year 1996 Billions of Dollars]

	1986	1991	1996	2001
INVESTING IN THE FUTURE				
Procurement (The Next Military):				
Amount	\$126	\$83	\$39	\$58
Percent of total	33	25	16	24
Research & Development (Capturing the Revolution in Military Affairs):				
Amount	\$46	\$41	\$34	\$27
Percent of total	12	12	14	11
CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE				
Operations & Maintenance (Readiness):				
Amount	\$104	\$105	\$92	\$85
Percent of total	27	31	37	35
Military Personnel (Today's Force Structure):				
Amount	\$89	\$95	\$69	\$64
Percent of total	23	28	28	27
Other				
Amount	\$18	\$13	\$12	\$7
Percent of total	5	4	5	3
Total	\$383	\$337	\$246	\$241

¹ Excludes expenditures for Desert Shield/Desert Storm which were primarily paid for through allied contributions

MISSION NO. 1: HEDGING AGAINST AN EMERGING PEER MILITARY COMPETITOR

The United States is currently dealing from a position of great military strength. No one doubts that the United States possesses the best military in the world. Our nuclear deterrent is sound. Our equipment is the most advanced and most capable of any nation and our uniformed personnel exhibit a high degree of competence and technical skill. The resources the nation commits to defense are substantial. Our defense spending is equal to that of the next six nations combined and we and our allies account for 80 percent of the world's expenditures on defense.

Yet it was not long ago that we had a military peer competitor, and if the reforms in Russia and China fail, we could have another in the foreseeable future. They might be particularly effective in their own regions of the world and could use commercially available technology to begin to close the gap. Hedging against this eventuality and deterring it should that become necessary should remain military priority number one.

This requires investing in the future. The percentage of the defense budget dedicated to this investment has fallen from 45 percent in 1986 to 30 percent in 1996. This shift is acceptable given the high tempo of current operations and the lack of a peer competitor, but the uncertainties of the future suggest this trend should be reversed.

Hedging against a peer competitor will require investment in both R&D and in procurement. Until recently, our investment in research, development, test and evaluation has held up well. It is now programmed to drop by \$7 billion over the next 5 years. While private commercial sector R&D can increasingly be used for military purposes (particularly in the areas of telecommunications, sensor technology, and automated data processing), a reduction of the magnitude planned over the next 5 years needs to be monitored carefully to ensure that we not jeopardize our ability to take full advantage of the revolution in military affairs (RMA).

The Department of Defense and the Joint Staff are working to stay on the cutting edge of the RMA with a specific focus on the opportunities technology provides. This is complemented by an increased need for quality professional military education for our officer corps to ensure a cadre of officers who will understand how to exploit these capabilities on the battlefields of the future.

The massive drop in the procurement account over the past 5 years is cause for concern. Today, due to the large investments of the 1980s, we have a considerable inventory of weapon systems that are better than anything our potential adversaries can bring to the table. There may also be reason to delay purchases somewhat to see what new weapons requirements the RMA suggests. Still, modernization of our equipment cannot be deferred indefinitely. In 1995, procurement of new Navy ships (6), fighter aircraft (28), and tanks (0), are all far below the steady state procurement rate needed to support the planned 1999 force. In the coming 10 to 15 years, stocks of some key weapons systems will be approaching obsolescence. The recent \$25 billion increase over 6 years requested by the administration is a down payment on the problem. By the end of the decade, we will need the significant increase in procurement spending proposed by the administration to ensure that our forces are equipped with sufficient numbers of modern weapons.

MISSION NO. 2: REGIONAL MILITARY CONFLICT AND THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW

The Bottom-Up Review concluded that the United States can cope with the challenge of two nearly simultaneous MRCs with a force structure 40 percent smaller than the peak years of the 1980s. The forces need to be well trained and ready and need adequate sea and airlift to make this strategy work.

The planned BUR force structure allows for only a small margin of error in executing a two MRC strategy. If the Desert Storm force were once again deployed to the Persian Gulf, only two active duty Army divisions, three active duty Air Force wings and one Marine Expeditionary Force would remain available for the beginning of a second conflict. There would be a significant requirement for Reserve forces. This problem would be offset somewhat by U.S. force enhancement initiatives in the area of strategic mobility, advanced munitions, and C³I which makes the remaining forces more capable than they were in 1991. In addition, the armed forces of both Iraq and North Korea, our two most likely enemies, have been degraded since 1991. But it is likely that the United States would need to rely more heavily on coalition partners to execute a two MRC strategy in the future, and so programs like IMET and joint combined exercises become increasingly important.

An issue has been raised about the readiness of this force to engage in two MRCs. The O&M account actually had increased slightly in fiscal year 1995 and remains relatively constant for fiscal year 1996. That coupled with the reductions in force structure meant that more resources were being planned for readiness and operations per active duty unit than in previous years. In 1995, O&M spending per Army battalion was up 17 percent over fiscal year 1993, per Navy ship it was up 11 percent, and per combat aircraft it was up 12 percent. Unfortunately, unexpected peace operations in Iraq, Haiti, Rwanda etc. ate into that planned increase and did create some readiness problems. This is the cause of the three Army divisions being rated "not ready" to execute all their wartime missions. Two of the three divisions have been designed for removal from the force structure this year and are not among the units programmed to implement the two MRC strategy. The \$2.6 billion supplemental now before the Congress is designed to restore readiness.

The two MRC strategy also requires the overseas presence of U.S. forces, both in Europe and Asia. Forward deployed forces provide confidence and stability in both regions, but they also serve as forward staging areas in time of conflict. Despite budget pressures in the United States, American forces should remain at the planned level of about 100,000 in both Europe and Asia.

MISSION NO. 3: COUNTERPROLIFERATION EFFORTS

Nonproliferation and counterproliferation has been a principal priority for recent administrations. During the past 2 years, some positive developments have occurred. South Africa, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine have each pledged to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Iraq's program has been further degraded under IAEA supervision. The Geneva Framework Agreement has at least provided a procedure, which if implemented, would remove North Korea's nuclear potential within a decade. It is a process under which North Korea can be held accountable. We should not undermine that process ourselves because we will be destroying North Korea's accountability. And the administration's recent decision to drop a 10 year review clause for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should help gain permanent extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty at the review conference this April.

Nonetheless, at least 20 countries—many hostile to the United States—are seeking to develop the capability to produce nuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. The May 1994 Deutch Report recommends an annual increase in spending of about \$400 million on 14,

counterproliferation programs. These should be considered for support by this committee.

MISSION NO. 4: DEVELOPING COST EFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

Problems like drug trafficking, refugees and pollution are increasingly becoming transnational in character, as criminals operate across borders and environmental problems arise on a global scale. For example, the U.S. Southern Command has been preoccupied recently with Cuban rafters, Haitian refugees and drug interdiction. The military's bill for environmental programs was \$5.5 billion in fiscal year 1994, including base restoration.

Some transnational threats seem to call for military forces to back up police forces that are outgunned and outmaneuvered by international criminal syndicates. Quasi-police operations have been normal for armed forces in many nations and for U.S. Armed Forces in times past. They have not however, played a major role since World War II in the activities of most of the armed forces, other than the Coast Guard and National Guard. There may well be resistance within the military to the use of increasingly scarce resources for quasi-police functions. The natural inclination of the military is to concentrate on preparing for major conflict rather than be drawn into areas for which military force is less obviously needed.

MISSION NO. 5: ENGAGING SELECTIVELY IN FAILED STATES

Attitudes toward peace operations have undergone a sea change in the past 2 years as the explosion of ethnic conflict and failed states have overextended U.N. capabilities and America's patience. This is a bipartisan problem. Of the 15 major U.N. peace operations currently underway only four (UNOSOM II, UNMIF, UNOMIG, UNAMIR) were initiated during the Clinton administration. Of the 27 different U.S. deployments since Desert Storm (generally to deal with failed states) 14 were ordered by the Bush administration.

PDD 25 has described the fairly strict set of criteria that will be used to determine when the United States will support U.N. peacekeeping operations and when we will participate. I have already suggested my own guidelines: the United States should focus on humanitarian missions and containment of local conflict and should beware of choosing sides in civil wars unless vital interests are at stake.

There are two Titles in H.R. 7 and S. 7 that deserve comment. Title IV would prohibit placing U.S. forces under command or operational control of foreign nationals acting on behalf of the United Nations, except if a Presidential Certification is made. Title V would subtract from America's annual U.N. peacekeeping assessment the non-reimbursed amount spent by U.S. forces in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations for the previous year. The first is unnecessary and the second could undermine U.N. peacekeeping worldwide.

During the past several months I have visited U.S. battalions in the Sinai and in Macedonia where U.S. forces report to a non-American force commander. Both operations have been extremely successful. U.S. officers serve as the Commanders' Chief of Staff. U.S. battalion commanders reserve the right to consult the U.S. chain of command if they receive orders that are unwise or inconsistent with their mission. Both deployments would be exempted by S. 7. There is reason for concern if command authority were relinquished over U.S. forces, but these two cases demonstrate that transferring operational control in cases of traditional peacekeeping should not be a problem if strictly monitored. Perhaps the legislation should be limited to Article VII peace enforcement operations where conflict is expected. If all nations passed legislation like Title IV, there would be no U.N. peacekeepers.

Title V of H.R. 7 is more troublesome. In the Section 101 findings, the bill notes that U.N. assessments to the United States for peacekeeping missions totalled almost \$1.5 billion in 1994. The non-reimbursed cost of U.S. military participation in U.N. mandated operations (according to Sec. 101) was \$1.7 billion. There may be value in limiting the U.S. peacekeeping assessment to 25 percent of total assessments, but Title V is not in our national interest. If Title V were in effect, the United States would have to default completely on its assessed contribution. If all other nations followed suit, there would be little money for peace operations.

These two provisions misjudge the value to the United States of U.N. peacekeeping. Many of these multilateral deployments are in areas important to U.S. interests like Kuwait, Israel's borders, Haiti, El Salvador and Cyprus. Most of the larger deployments were engineered by the United States in the Security Council to further our own national security interests. Some provided international legitimacy for U.S. deployments. Other U.N. deployments provide for humanitarian relief widely supported by the American people, but other nations are called upon to send forces. A collapse of U.N. peacekeeping would be a severe setback for U.S. interests.

CONCLUSIONS

The principal conclusion of this assessment is that the United States must give priority to its relationships with the great powers, both to sustain cooperative relations if possible but also to hedge against and deter the possible emergence of a peer competitor in the decades ahead. Preparing to win regional conflicts, overcoming transnational threats and participating selectively in peace operations are also important missions, but our priorities must be kept in mind. However, the reductions suggested for U.N. peace operations in H.R. 7 and S. 7 are marginal compared to the overall defense budget. The damage they would do to our national security is enormous.

The drop in the proportion of the budget set aside for "investment" needs careful monitoring. R&D spending appears adequate this year but cuts planned for the future should not undermine efforts to take full advantage of the potential revolution in military affairs. The low levels of spending on procurement might be tolerated for another year or two because of the large arsenal purchased in the 1980s and the need to more fully incorporate the pending RMA into future purchases. But the significant increases in procurement spending recommended by the administration for fiscal years 1997-2001 will be needed to avoid block obsolescence 10-15 years from now, when a peer competitor might emerge.

While readiness and quality of life are vital for today's force, we cannot afford to postpone greater investment in the future for much longer. Since we cannot cut any deeper into the current force structure, the overall defense budget will have to increase somewhat in the future to assure growth in the investment accounts.

Senator WARNER [presiding]. Thank you, Doctor. That is an important message that you have just given us.

Dr. Wolfowitz, we are delighted to have you. We recognize you had an unexpected impediment in your travel plans, but we are nevertheless always grateful to have you before this committee.

STATEMENT OF PAUL WOLFOWITZ, PH.D., DEAN, THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Ambassador WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to be here. I have to apologize. I think I am definitely showing the absence of the marvelous staff that I used to have in the Pentagon because I thought our hearing was beginning at 10:00 and not at 9:30, and my apologies.

I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before this distinguished committee to discuss the important issue of U.S. defense strategy. Since time is short and the subject is a large one, let me try to briefly sketch what I think are a few of the major points that need to be considered.

The most important point that I would like to make this morning is that it is a mistake to reduce U.S. defense strategy to the question of how many wars we should plan to fight at one time, although that is an important question. In fact, even that question is larger than it appears because it is actually a question of how large a force structure we should have, not only in relation to how many wars or crises we might face, but also to allow for the possibility that a single conflict might be longer than expected, or our losses might be higher, or that we might have to fight differently than we expected, for example, offensively rather than defensively. In fact, it was this last consideration that led President Bush to double the size of the force he sent to the Persian Gulf when he directed our armed forces to liberate Kuwait rather than simply to defend Saudi Arabia.

So, the question of how many wars to fight is really a shorthand for a larger question of how large a force structure to maintain, but

even that question, important as it is, is an inadequate lens for viewing defense strategy. It is particularly inadequate, I think, when contemplating a future that may be very different from the present. Thus, whatever its limitations during the period of the Cold War when we had one principal, identifiable competitor, whose future capabilities were somewhat predictable, its limitations are far more serious in an era when the capabilities of our present possible enemies, in particular Iraq and North Korea, are relatively small—I would not say small. I emphasize “relatively” small. But we need to consider the possibility of a very different future in which we once again face a major competitor in which the technology which is revolutionizing how we communicate and how we collect and process data will also probably have revolutionized military affairs.

I would argue that a major goal of U.S. defense strategy should be, if possible, to prevent or deter the emergence of such a future military competitor because it will be far more costly and far more dangerous to deal with one if we have to. But that is a question that is largely unaddressed by the focus on how many wars to fight. Too much emphasis on that question, important though it is, I believe places too much emphasis on a false sense of certainty that we can predict the shape of future conflicts; places too much emphasis on the requirements of defensive military missions as opposed to offensive missions, or in fact punitive ones, all of which I think we need to consider; places too little emphasis on the requirements for deterring wars or preventing them as opposed to fighting them when they occur; and perhaps most seriously, places too little emphasis on the requirements of long-term competitiveness, which includes maintaining the quality of our military personnel and our technological edge, but also something more than that, namely our capacity to innovate.

Too much emphasis on force structure as the defining question of strategy risks freezing us with a force structure that is large enough but not innovative enough, that may be the right force for the late 20th century, but the wrong force for the 21st. Let me try to elaborate briefly.

Our armed forces perform many functions. Having invested as much in them as we have, it is appropriate at times—and I would say at limited times—to use them for other purposes, such as helping hurricane victims or feeding starving people. However, it is not for humanitarian missions that we invest so much or risk the lives of American men and women, but rather to protect our national security. That broad objective encompasses a number of more specific ones, but one of the most important is to prevent the military domination of a major portion of the globe by a hostile power. That is the reason we fought two World Wars and a Cold War in this century, and it remains the one thing that would most endanger our national security and even our survival as a Nation.

A second important objective, increasingly important as we face the possibility of further proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, is to protect American citizens from terrorist attacks both at home and abroad.

Today we face a fortunate situation in which there is no such global threat, the threat of the military domination of a major por-

tion of the globe. Some might say that, therefore, we need not concern ourselves with that problem. However, unless we want to stake our national security on a belief that human nature and the behavior of nations has fundamentally changed, that would be a mistake and a potentially fatal one. There could be no greater failure of this generation than to bequeath that danger to the next.

I might say as an aside, I think viewed in that perspective, it is why I believe the most important areas to focus on in our defense strategy are those areas that in fact have the economic industrial power to generate major threats to U.S. security, and that means in particular Europe and Northeast Asia and to a lesser extent, but nonetheless considerable because of the oil resources that are there, the Persian Gulf. It does not mean Haiti. It does not mean Somalia as an obvious aside.

Rather, we should view our present strategic situation as one in which we have acquired enormous strategic depth. At a cost that is relatively low in historical terms, we can preserve that strategic depth and keep the costs of defense comparatively low and the major threats to our national security relatively remote. But it is a lot like insurance: if we fail to take the actions or make the investments necessary to keep threats small in the near term and to maintain our military competitiveness in the long term, we could pay a far higher price to try to deal with a major threat after it is too late. And that price would be measured not only in a much higher percentage of our GNP for defense, but in lives lost and in much greater danger of nuclear war.

Strategy is not just about deciding which wars we will fight, but about navigating our way to our desired objectives in the future and relating our present actions to the future outcomes we hope to achieve. From that perspective there are a number of important considerations that get lost when we focus too exclusively on how many regional contingencies to prepare for. Let me mention four.

Perhaps most important is the need to account for uncertainty in our strategy and planning. None of the major threats we have faced in this century was foreseen more than a decade before it appeared. None of the smaller wars we have fought in the last 50 years were seen clearly even 5 years before they occurred. Certainly I know of no individual in 1945 who would have dreamed of suggesting, after the United States had just assembled the most powerful armed force in the history of the world, that a short 5 years later we might be almost driven off the Korean peninsula by a third or fourth rate military power.

At the NATO summit in London in July of 1990, the summit that declared an end to the Cold War, Prime Minister Thatcher, as chair of the meeting, opened by saying, "Europe stands today on the dawn of a new era, as promising in its own way as 1919 and 1945." Obviously she meant that if we were not careful, the promise of 1990 could fail as badly as the promise of those earlier years. But I doubt that even she imagined that less than a month later, Saddam Hussein would invade Kuwait and the United States would be involved in one of the largest overseas military deployments since World War II.

Yet, despite these experiences, we continue to develop scenarios and design forces against those scenarios as though we could pre-

dict not just the near future, but the more remote one. These scenarios are a useful analytical tool. I would underscore that. I have used them a lot myself in my own work in the past, but when they become the principal test of defense strategy, they become like the bed of Procrustes in Greek mythology: capabilities that are judged redundant by this standard are wrongly cut off, while some capabilities that may be genuinely redundant are stretched to fit it.

As difficult as it is to make allowances for uncertainty in defense strategy, precisely because it is uncertain, it is really at the heart of the matter. If we fail to do so, we are only fooling ourselves.

Second, our defense strategy should do more than deal with threats that the world throws up at us. It also shapes that world in fundamental ways. It does so by supporting the powerful structure of alliances that did so much to bring about a peaceful and successful end to the Cold War and that can do so much to shape a peaceful world in the future. It does so by preventing or damping destabilizing military competition that would take place in the absence of a U.S. security role, such as the kind of competition, to be specific, that might occur between Japan and China or between Germany and Russia absent an American commitment in those areas. It does so by providing an environment for many countries to concentrate on peaceful economic and democratic development of the kind that helps produce a genuinely more stable world in the long run. And it does so not only by deterring threats, but by preventing many threats from even emerging. I believe that the world we live in has been fundamentally shaped by the assumption on the part of many people that certain military actions would simply not be tolerated by the United States and its allies and therefore they direct their ambitions elsewhere. Obviously that is not sufficient for people like Saddam Hussein for whom more specific deterrence is necessary, but the world would be a very different and more dangerous place if the influence of U.S. military leadership were removed.

And that leads me to a third important requirement of U.S. strategy, namely to preserve that capacity for U.S. leadership. That is very different from U.S. domination or from the notion of the United States as a super power that can do everything. It is precisely in order to preserve one of our greatest assets, the voluntary alliance that we have with the most powerful nations in the world, that we must maintain our capacity to lead. It seems paradoxical to some, but the ability of the United States to act unilaterally when necessary is the key to our ability to assemble multilateral coalitions, as we did in the Persian Gulf, coalitions that can share the risks and the burdens with us.

Finally, a credible defense strategy must maintain our ability to compete militarily in the long run. Getting the proper emphasis on this element of defense strategy is perhaps the one most endangered by excessive emphasis on force structure for specific contingencies. But it is a particularly important element of our strategy at a time when the immediate threats that we face are comparatively small, but when the proliferation of advanced weaponry and potential large shifts in the distribution of world economic and industrial power could present us with a very different future. And it is made even more important by the fact that we are going

through a period of potentially revolutionary change in military affairs that could be as large in its consequences as the revolutionary change that took place during the 1920's and 1930's or the revolution brought about by the invention of nuclear weapons.

Maintaining our long-term competitiveness obviously involves investment in technology, but that by itself is not enough. It involves investment in people as well. It was correctly observed during the Gulf War that smart weapons require smart people, and we were fortunate then to have both. But good technology and good people are necessary but not sufficient to remain competitive. It is also necessary to maintain our capacity to innovate.

During one of those earlier revolutions in military affairs, it was not the Germans who invented tanks. It was the British and French who first fielded them, but it was the Germans who figured out how to make tanks a decisive instrument of warfare with terrible and almost fatal consequences. Lest we think that our present domination of military technology and the art of warfare is so complete that no one could possibly challenge it, it is worth reflecting on the fact that in military affairs, as in industrial affairs in the case of General Motors or other great corporations, organizations that are at the top of their business are sometimes the ones that have the greatest difficulty innovating. Because their style has proved so successful, it is sometimes hardest for them to recognize that it will no longer be successful in new conditions.

It may appear that I am saying we should do more than just prepare to fight two major regional contingencies at a time when there is serious question whether we can afford to do even that. The problem is that a successful defense strategy requires balancing among several competing purposes, and that balance is particularly important but also particularly difficult when you are dealing with a long-term future that is potentially very different from the present. The procrustean bed of force structure, defined in terms of the numbers of wars we prepare for, provides a comforting but false sense of certainty both for those who want to economize and for those who are more concerned about maintaining adequate defense capabilities. For the analysts, it provides a single simple yardstick by which all things can be measured, and capabilities that are redundant by that standard can be dispensed with. For the military, it provides a standard of adequacy on the basis of which they can appeal for more resources. But for both it leads to a distortion of priorities.

To a significant extent I believe this problem arises because we have failed to provide any stable long-term spending horizons with which our military can plan. When every floor on defense spending has a way of turning into a ceiling and cuts are exacerbated by the intrusion of many non-defense items into the defense budget, force structure becomes the most solid thing that people can cling to to protect against indiscriminate cuts.

Because of the preeminent position that the United States and its allies enjoy now at the end of the Cold War, it is possible for us to balance the competing demands of defense strategy at levels that should be affordable. A defense burden at the level of slightly higher than 3 percent of GNP seems eminently affordable as an insurance policy to preserve a safer world for our children. To those

who say that it is still too much, I would argue that we will pay far more in the long run for false economies and pay not only in higher defense spending but in lives lost and in greater dangers to our country.

If that is so, I believe that Congress could do a great serve by providing stable budget profiles for the U.S. defense establishment and focus its attention on an intelligent balancing of priorities within that profile. As long as force structure is taken as the principal measure of the adequacy of our military posture, there will be no incentive to trade a larger force structure for a higher quality, but smaller force structure in the future because such choices will simply leave us with a smaller force structure.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Wolfowitz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEAN, THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF
ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this distinguished committee to discuss the important issue of U.S. defense strategy. Since time is short and our subject is a large one, let me just briefly sketch what I believe are a few of the major points that need to be considered in thinking about this subject.

The most important point that I would like to make this morning is that it is a mistake to reduce U.S. defense strategy to the question of how many wars we should plan to fight at one time, although that is an important question. In fact, even that question is larger than it appears, because it is actually the question of how large a force structure we should have, not only in relation to how many wars or crises we might face, but also to allow for the possibility that a single conflict might be longer than expected, or our losses might be higher, or we might have to fight differently than expected, for example offensively rather than defensively. In fact, it was this last consideration that led President Bush to double the size of the force sent to the Persian Gulf when he directed our Armed Forces to liberate Kuwait rather than simply to defend Saudi Arabia.

So the question of how many wars to fight is really a short-hand for a larger question of how large a force structure to maintain. But even that question, important as it is, is an inadequate lens for viewing defense strategy. It is particularly inadequate when thinking about a future than may be very different from the present. Thus, whatever its limitations during the period of the Cold War when we had one principal, identifiable competitor, whose future capabilities were somewhat predictable, its limitations are far more serious in an era when the capabilities of our present possible enemies, such as Iraq and North Korea, are relatively small, but we need to consider the possibility of a very different future in which we once again face a major competitor and in which the technology which is revolutionizing how we communicate and how we collect and process data will also probably revolutionize military affairs.

In fact, I would argue that a major goal of U.S. defense strategy should be, if possible, to prevent or deter the emergence of such a future military competitor, because it will be far more costly, and far more dangerous, to deal with one if we have to. But that is a question that is largely unaddressed by the focus on how many wars to fight. Too much emphasis on that question, important though it is:

- places too much emphasis on a false sense of certainty that we can predict the shape of future conflicts;
- places too much emphasis on the requirements of defensive military missions, as opposed to offensive or simply punitive ones;
- places too little emphasis on the requirements for deterring wars or preventing them, as opposed to fighting them when they occur; and,
- perhaps most seriously, places too little emphasis on the requirements of long term competitiveness, which includes maintaining the quality of our military personnel and our technological edge, but also something more than that, namely our capacity to innovate, both tactically and strategically, organizationally and doctrinally.

Most of all, too much emphasis on force structure as the defining question of strategy risks freezing us with a force structure that is large enough but not innovative enough, that may be the right force for the late 20th century but the wrong force for the 21st century.

Let me try to elaborate briefly.

Our Armed Forces perform many functions. Having invested as much in them as we have, it is appropriate at times to use them for other purposes, such as helping hurricane victims or feeding starving people. However, it is not for humanitarian missions that we invest so much or risk the lives of American men and women, but rather to protect our national security. That broad objective encompasses a number of more specific ones, but one of the most important is to prevent the military domination of a major portion of the globe by a hostile power. That is the reason we fought two world wars and a cold war in this century and it remains the one thing that would most endanger our national security and even our survival as a nation. A second important objective, increasingly important as we face the possibility of further proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, is to protect American citizens from terrorist attacks, both at home and abroad.

Today we face a fortunate situation in which there is no such threat of the military domination of a major portion of the globe. Some might say that therefore we need not concern ourselves with that problem. However, unless we want to stake our national security on a belief that human nature and the behavior of nations has fundamentally changed, that would be a mistake and a potentially fatal one. There could be no greater failure of this generation than to bequeath that danger to the next generation.

Rather, we should view our present strategic situation as one in which we have acquired enormous strategic depth. At a cost that is relatively low in historical terms, we can preserve that strategic depth and keep the costs of defense comparatively low and the major threats to our national security relatively remote. But it is a lot like insurance. If we fail to take the actions or make the investments necessary to keep threats small in the near term and to maintain our military competitiveness in the long term, we could pay a far higher price to try to deal with a major threat after it is too late. And that price would be measured not only in a much higher percentage of our GNP for defense, but in lives lost and in much greater danger of nuclear war.

In fact, strategy is not just about deciding which wars we will fight but about navigating our way to our desired objectives in the future and relating our present actions to the future outcomes we hope to achieve. From that perspective there are a number of important considerations that get lost with too exclusive a focus on how many major regional contingencies to prepare for:

— Perhaps most important is the need to account for uncertainty in our strategy and planning. None of the major threats we have faced in this century was foreseen more than a decade before it appeared. None of the smaller wars we have fought in the last 50 years was foreseen clearly even 5 years before. Certainly, no one in 1945 would have dreamed of suggesting, after the United States had assembled the most powerful armed force in the history of the world, that 5 years later we might be almost driven off of the Korean Peninsula by a third or fourth rate military power.

At the NATO Summit in London in July 1990, the summit which declared an end to the Cold War, Prime Minister Thatcher, as chair of the meeting, opened by saying "Europe stands today on the dawn of a new era, as promising in its own way as 1919 and 1945." Obviously she meant that if we were not careful, the promise of 1990 could fail as badly as the promise of those earlier years. But I doubt that even she imagined that less than a month later Saddam Hussein would invade Kuwait and the United States would be involved in one of the largest overseas military deployments since World War II.

Yet despite these experiences, we continue to develop scenarios and design forces against those scenarios as though we could predict not just the near future but the more remote future. These scenarios are a useful analytical tool, but when they become the principal test of defense strategy they become like the bed of Procrustes in Greek mythology—capabilities that are judged redundant by this standard are wrongly cut off, while some capabilities that may be genuinely redundant are stretched to fit it.

As difficult as it is to make allowances for uncertainty in defense strategy—precisely because it is uncertain—it is really at the heart of the matter. If we fail to do so, we are only fooling ourselves.

— Our defense strategy should do more than deal with threats that the world throws up at us. It also shapes that world in very important ways. It does so by supporting the powerful structure of alliances that did so much to bring about a peaceful and successful end to the Cold War and can do so much to shape a peaceful world in the future. It does so by preventing or damping destabilizing military competition that would take place in the absence of a U.S. security role. It does so by providing an environment for many countries to concentrate on peaceful economic

and democratic development of the kind that helps produce a genuinely more stable world in the long run. And it does so not only by deterring threats but by preventing many threats from even emerging—I believe that the world we live in has been fundamentally shaped by the assumption on the part of many people that certain military actions would simply not be tolerated by the United States and its allies and therefore they direct their ambitions elsewhere. Obviously that is not sufficient for people like Saddam Hussein, for whom more specific deterrence is necessary, but the world would be a very different and more dangerous place if the influence of U.S. military leadership were removed.

— A third important requirement of U.S. strategy is to preserve the capacity for U.S. leadership. That is very different from U.S. domination or the notion of the United States as a superpower that can do everything. It is precisely in order to preserve one of our greatest assets, the voluntary alliance with us of the most powerful nations in the world, that we must maintain our capacity to lead. It seems paradoxical to some, but the ability of the United States to act unilaterally when necessary is the key to our ability to assemble multilateral coalitions, as we did in the Persian Gulf, that can share the risks and burdens with us.

— Finally, a credible defense strategy must maintain our ability to compete militarily in the long run. Getting the proper emphasis on this element of our defense strategy is perhaps the one most endangered by excessive emphasis on force structure for specific contingencies. But it is a particularly important element of our strategy at a time when the immediate threats that we face are comparatively small, while the proliferation of advanced weaponry and the potential for large shifts in the distribution of world economic and industrial power could present us with a very different future. And it is made even more important by the fact that we are going through a period of potentially revolutionary change in military affairs that could be as large in its consequences as the revolutionary change that took place during the 1920s and 1930s or the revolution brought about by the invention of nuclear weapons.

Maintaining our long term competitiveness obviously involves investment in technology, but that by itself is not enough. It involves investment in people as well. It was correctly observed during the Gulf War that smart weapons require smart people, and we were fortunate then to have both, but it takes time and effort to develop and attract good people. But good technology and good people are necessary but not sufficient to remain competitive. It is also essential to maintain our capacity to innovate.

During one of those earlier revolutions in military affairs, it was not the Germans who invented tanks. It was the British and French who first fielded them, but it was the Germans who figured out how to make them a decisive instrument of warfare, with terrible and almost fatal consequences. Lest we think that our present domination of military technology and the art of warfare is so complete that no one could possibly challenge it, it is worth reflecting on the fact that in military affairs, as in industrial affairs, organizations that are at the top of their business are sometimes the ones that have the greatest difficulty innovating. Because their style has proved so successful, it is sometimes hardest for them to recognize that it will no longer be successful in new conditions.

It may appear that I am saying we should do more than just prepare to fight two major regional contingencies at a time when there is serious question whether we can afford to do even that. The problem is that a successful defense strategy requires balancing among several competing purposes, and that balance is particularly important and particularly difficult when one is dealing with a long-term future that is potentially very different from the present. The procustean bed of force structure defined in terms of numbers of wars we prepare for provides a comforting but false sense of certainty both for those who want to economize and for those who are more concerned about maintaining adequate defense capabilities. For the analysts it provides a single simple yardstick by which all things can be measured and capabilities that are redundant by that standard can be dispensed with. For the military, it provides a standard of adequacy on the basis of which they can appeal for more resources. But for both it leads to a distortion of priorities.

To a significant extent this problem arises because we have failed to provide any stable long-term spending horizons with which our military can plan. When every floor on defense spending has a way of turning into a ceiling, and cuts are exacerbated by the intrusion of many non-defense items into the defense budget, force structure becomes the most solid thing that people can hang onto to protect against indiscriminate cuts.

Because of the preeminent position that the United States and its allies enjoyed at the end of the Cold War, it is possible for us to balance the competing demands of defense strategy at levels that should be affordable. A defense burden at the level

of 3 percent of GNP or slightly higher seems eminently affordable as an insurance policy that can preserve a safer world for our children. To those who say that it is still too much, I would argue that we will pay more in the long run for false economies, and pay not only in higher defense spending but in lives lost and in greater dangers to our country.

If that is so, I believe that Congress could do a great service by providing stable budget profiles for the U.S. defense establishment and focus its attention on an intelligent balancing of priorities within that profile. As long as force structure is taken as the principal measure of the adequacy of our military posture, there will be no incentive to trade a smaller force structure for a higher quality force, because such choices will simply leave us with a smaller force structure.

Chairman THURMOND [resumes chair]. We will now proceed with questions. I have made an opening statement, so I will just take 5 minutes for questions. Other members have not made an opening statement, so we are going to allow them 7 minutes if they care to make an opening statement and ask questions.

Ambassador Wolfowitz, in your opinion is the Department of Defense's Bottom-Up Review a strategy or is it something else?

Ambassador WOLFOWITZ. I think it is something else, and I think I agree with what Dr. Zakheim said, that the real problem is not so much with how the Defense Department went about it, but with the absence of a broader strategic framework in which to look at requirements. As a result, I think it becomes a rather narrow analytical tool that focuses on a part of the problem, but only a part of the problem.

Chairman THURMOND. Dr. Zakheim, it seems we are facing a modernization crisis. Have you done an assessment of how much money we need to add to the administration's requested levels for research and development and for procurement over the next 5 years?

Dr. ZAKHEIM. We have done an overall assessment, Mr. Chairman. As I mentioned, we are talking in the region of something over the \$150 billion mark GAO talked about for the 5 years ending in fiscal year 1999. I can get you that, sir, in a written response. My guess is we are talking about at least a 50 percent increase in the dollars that have been allocated if you wish to maintain the Bottom-Up Review force level that the administration is supporting.

Chairman THURMOND. Dr. Binnendijk, you seem to advocate the use of U.S. military forces for a wide variety of peacekeeping and peacemaking missions. It is now becoming apparent, however, that even brief employment of U.S. forces for these purposes may seriously erode their readiness for their primary combat missions. Would you continue to support such nontraditional missions if, in fact, they detract from combat readiness?

Dr. BINNENDIJK. Mr. Chairman, I believe we have to be very cautious about the way we use American forces in peacekeeping operations, but there are cases in which it does make sense to me. Haiti is one. Our deployment in Macedonia is a second.

It is true that what a force does in a peacekeeping operation is different from what it does when it is fighting, but having witnessed, for example, what our forces do in Macedonia, they are training as they are actively engaged in operations. While they may not be engaged in combat operations, I think peacekeeping operations provided much more training that is transferable to combat than one believes.

So, the answer is I think we have to be cautious, but I think it is valuable to our national interests to engage in some of these peace operations, and there is value for training as well.

Chairman THURMOND. Ambassador Wolfowitz, there seem to be three large gaps in the administration's approach to strategy and force planning. For instance, it seeks to protect interests not vital to the United States. Second, military forces are over-committed. Third, budgets do not fully fund the forces needed to implement stated objectives.

Should we consider narrowing our definition of interest, increasing and strengthening forces, and increasing defense budgets? If we do not address these gaps, does it seem likely that someone will be tempted to call our bluff?

Ambassador WOLFOWITZ. It is a big question.

As I indicated in my statement, I think we do need to concentrate very heavily on those areas that are truly vital to U.S. national interests, and I think the most important standard for that are those places that can present us with major threats, either because of the kind of military industrial power they may summon in the future, or in specific cases because of the proliferation threat that they pose. I think at a time when budgets are tight and we obviously cannot adequately fund what we are trying to do, it is particularly questionable to be committing significant resources in areas that are of secondary interest to us.

I think also it is important to keep our military establishment primarily concentrated on its main business which is the ability to fight and win wars and the ability to innovate and maintain our military technological edge well into the next century.

Chairman THURMOND. My time is up. Senator Robb?

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all three of our witnesses this morning for their comments.

I am going to have to leave in a few minutes and will not be able to remain for all of the questions. Rather than ask specific detailed questions, I have a couple of general questions that I would like to propound to all three of our distinguished witnesses, if I may.

In listening to the testimony of all three experts in this area, I do not recall hearing anything about the role of public opinion and world opinion and how it influences decisions that relate to strategy and policy. It seems to me that that is something that increasingly must be weighed into our considerations. It may be something that we have to reject and have to maintain enough backbone, I guess, to reject from time to time. But there is no question that the advent of instant accessibility to visual events and what have you have played a role, and I think increasingly play a role, particularly in some of the regional conflicts, that would not be as high on the list of priorities and yet clearly are a major factor in forming public opinion and world opinion, and that has an impact. So, I would just be interested in what legitimate role that has and how we deal with it.

Second, Dr. Zakheim I think made the point that the Bottom-Up Review was not strategy driven, it was dollar driven. At what point, though, do we make the tradeoff? Accepting the fact that we do not have a limitless number of dollars, where can we legiti-

mately say here is a level that the defense establishment is going to have to work within?

I say that as someone who is both a deficit hawk and someone who is particularly concerned about underfunding our defense structure and creating even the potential future prospect of hollowness in areas that are strategically important.

So, any philosophical comment on either of those broader questions would be very welcome.

Ambassador WOLFOWITZ. If I may try your first question, Senator. Maybe one reason we did not talk about public opinion is we are speaking to the experts, and I speak with some humility here.

I think to focus first on what I think may be the main point of your question, which is what people dub the CNN effect. I think from the experience I have had and from what I have observed, it seems to me the fundamental point is it is a great mistake to make major decisions, and especially decisions about the use of force, based on the television images of the day.

That is not to say that public opinion is unimportant, but it is to say that the public opinion that matters is the public opinion that is going to be formed by long-term results that people may in a flash of a CNN photo say we ought to do something, but when they actually see what doing something produces, the opinion may be very different. I think Presidents in particular do very well, and especially when use of force is involved, to think about where they are going to be 6 months from now or a year from now and not thinking about today's news. I think there is a lot of experience, both good and bad, to demonstrate that.

If you are talking about the broader question of public opinion to support the kind of defense posture we need to have, that is absolutely critical. One can dream about defense strategy, and if the American public will not support it, it is quite irrelevant.

I do think that the basic point of insurance, the basic point that while we enjoy a much safer world, we want to keep it that way and not have it go back to the kinds of tragedies and struggles we have seen in this century, I think is a point people understand.

I think the point about American military supremacy, which people do not like to hear it, but I think the American public is much more comfortable when the United States is number one than with any other country.

Finally, to come to world opinion, I think that is also true of most countries in the world. A lot of people do not like the sound of talking about the United States as the world's military power, at least a lot of people in this country, but most people around the world would much rather have the United States as the world's leading military power than anyone else. If we cede the field, there will be someone else.

Senator ROBB. Thank you. Dr. Zakheim?

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Senator, I will try to take both of those questions. I agree with what Paul Wolfowitz just said.

There are a number of factors that we need to bear in mind, and the first is what we mean by public opinion. Polls do not always reflect what people think. They sometimes reflect what the pollsters want them to answer by the way they frame the question.

Senator ROBB. Let me just suggest it was not just daily polls, but in other words, what is the role of public opinion generally? It drives a lot of our domestic policy. It clearly has a major influence on how foreign policy and defense policy is perceived, and it is clearly more readily available today than it was 20 or 30 years ago because of CNN and other factors. The question is, how do we integrate that into part of our strategic thinking?

Dr. ZAKHEIM. There is no question that we have to recognize where the country is generally headed. Mr. Weinberger, when he was Secretary of Defense, laid out several principles about this. One of them was that he really did not want to commit forces to war unless he knew the United States was fully behind him, and that meant the people of the United States. General Colin Powell, when he was Chairman, said exactly the same thing.

The CNN effect sometimes is overstated anyway. There has been a massive debate in this country about Bosnia for several years. The tragedy of Bosnia is on television every single day. This administration has chosen, for its own reasons, not to get involved, and there are many people who will debate the issue both ways. But clearly CNN has not militated—and all these images have not militated—our going in. So, there is a fine line there between a sense of where the country wants to go and where leadership, for better or for worse, has to lead.

We know, for instance, that this country no longer is prepared to tolerate large casualties, at least for the time being. It is very difficult to fight a war under those kinds of circumstances. In my testimony, which by the way I should have added is my own personal view, I noted the fact that because we do not want large casualties, that does militate a focus on certain kinds of forces, on weapons that are more weapon systems-intensive, if you will, rather than people-intensive. That is simply the way the country is headed right now.

But again, I would reiterate what Paul Wolfowitz said. We have to account for public opinion, but we should not let it dominate us. Leaders are meant to lead. That is why they are elected.

On the second issue, which is at what point do we trade off between what the requirements appear to call for in dollar terms based on a strategy and the other demands of our budget, my first point is that we not treat the defense budget as residual. That means we have already made the tradeoff. We have decided on everything else and then we have said in effect that what is left is for national defense. This is not original. Truman did it at one point. Eisenhower did it at one point. I have some difficulty with that approach.

We have to begin with a strategy that reflects how we see ourselves in the world, what it is we want to do, and what are the interests we wish to protect. This has been the historic method for the last 30-odd years, as you well know, Senator. Then we calculate what it is we think we might need in order to carry out that strategy. At that point we look at the dollars and we begin to fine tune the forces always with the strategy in mind. What troubled me about the BUR is how one can fine tune forces when there is no strategy that is obviously in mind.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Cohen?

I might state that I have another engagement. I am going to ask Senator Warner to take over.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Zakheim, I was curious about your last statement about how leaders are elected to lead. Unfortunately, we have seen a recent phenomenon take place not only in this administration, but in past administrations with the arrival of overnight polls that are taken by the major networks, either television in combination with the Wall Street Journal or with the Washington Post or others. Those are persistent and they are used to guide leadership in the White House and I might say even some in Congress. It has been one of the very discouraging trends I think in recent years and one which I think can only undermine the ability to lead rather than follow the poll results overnight.

Dr. Binnendijk, you indicated—and I was a little bit confused about this. You can clarify it for me. You said the major powers are not building major weapon systems to attack one another. I was curious about that because my understanding is, for example, that the former Soviet Union has not abated its submarine construction program from the Cold War years. Those would include offensive weapons, as well as an attack submarine, by way of example.

You also indicated that there is some good news in terms of the framework of North Korea, the agreement with them. I will ask Dr. Wolfowitz if he is as semi-sanguine as you are about the outcome of North Korea.

But you also touched on Iraq and Iran. I believe the intelligence community would indicate that they are much closer. Notwithstanding the devastation of the war with Iraq, they are, nonetheless, too close for comfort to resuscitating their nuclear weapons program, and the Iranians are not far away from having an indigenous one of their own. So, I just raise that question in terms of your note of optimism in that regard. I will ask you for comments about it in a moment.

Dr. Zakheim, I would like to ask you more about the comment about how geography has not changed. I think you indicate on page 21, probably paraphrasing Bismarck, that there are two things in the world that do not change, history and geography, geography being the one I am focusing on, and that we have to have a sea power capability, a force projection capability.

I was wondering how you would argue this in terms of tactical land-based bombers versus aircraft carrier and Navy attack capability. Would you elaborate on that a little bit? Because there seems to be some notion that the Air force, for example, will have more B-2 bombers as one potential option. The Air Force has placed a very high priority on the F-22, and there is some notion that that F-22 funding should come out of the SEN account. I was wondering what your thoughts are about that.

Dr. BINNENDIJK. Well, let me start, Senator.

My comment about major powers not designing forces to attack one another I think is true. I think there is a lot of inertia in the system. There is inertia in the Russian system. There is inertia in our system, but the Bottom-Up Review is not designed either to defend or attack—

Senator COHEN. Did you say NATO powers or major powers?

Dr. BINNENDIJK. Major powers.

Senator COHEN. Would the production of chemical weapons, of biological weapons by the major powers not constitute a production of an offensive major weapons program? I am talking about Russia in particular right now, but there are others, of course, who are engaged in this.

Dr. BINNENDIJK. I think much of this is a carryover from the Cold War, and we see certainly in the chemical area a turnaround.

Senator COHEN. It is a direct violation of agreements. It is not just a carryover of inertia from the Cold War. It is a direct violation of the agreements.

Dr. BINNENDIJK. To the extent that it is going on, it should be stopped. I agree with that.

But I was trying to make a broader point that the situation today, as it has been for the last 4 or 5 years, is really quite different from any other period in this century. We have a high degree of cooperation among the major powers. I am certain that there is inertia and programs underway in each of those areas.

Now, with regard to non-proliferation, my optimism was not based primarily on North Korea. I did not mention Iran. My optimism was based primarily on reversals in South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine.

Senator COHEN. I thought I heard you mention Iraq.

Dr. BINNENDIJK. I mentioned Iraq, and there I do think it was as a result of Desert Storm and the IAEA efforts. There have been highly intrusive inspections. Their program has been hurt badly. I do not deny their intentions in the long run. That is why I think it is very important to focus on counterproliferation and the programs put forward in the Deutsch Report.

Senator COHEN. Dr. Zakheim, before you comment on the F-22, my understanding is that that aircraft is really designed to out-perform two stealthy Soviet aircraft that are not going to be built, namely the air superiority fighter and the counter air fighter. I am told that in order to maintain the justification for the F-22, the Air Force is applying to these two aircraft names upgrades that would be developed to the Russian aircraft. In other words, they are ascribing upgrades to current aircraft that would match the capabilities for which the F-22 was designed to compensate for.

Do you have any thoughts about that?

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, Senator, I think you have been around here long enough to know that systems sometimes take on different justifications. That is not to impugn the Air Force at all. The principle behind the F-22, as you well know, was that the Air Force wanted an improved land-based tactical aircraft that would be even more survivable than the ones they have. That is a laudable objective. Over the long term, whether it is a Russian upgrade or some other upgrade, it does not really matter. It leads me to answering your first question. Perhaps I rushed through my testimony too quickly.

The point is that I do not see the tradeoff at all between any of these two choices, that is, the B-2 or F-22, and the sea-based forces. That is why I made my point about geography. Let us look at each of the three so-called alternatives, which would be carrier-based air and the F-22 and the B-2.

The B-2 theoretically could hit targets that carrier-based aircraft can hit. There is no question about it. The problem, of course, is if the requirement is to pick up some more targets, or to loiter, to respond, or if you have to keep coming back, the B-2 cannot do that very well. There are not enough of them. They are not going to stay around long enough, and the longer they stay around, the less stealthy they are by definition. People are going to see them eventually in some way.

What the B-2 can do is go a very long distance, initiate a strike, come back, and come back safely. That is a phenomenal capability, but I do not see that as a capability that replaces what carrier-based aviation does. It supplements carrier aviation.

The F-22 is terrific if there are land bases. There is no question about it. If we wish to operate out of Saudi Arabia against Iraq or Iran, the F-22 is fantastic. Suppose the problem is Saudi Arabia and we cannot operate out of Saudi Arabia. Suppose the problem is somewhere else that we thought we could operate from and we cannot operate from there.

Senator COHEN. Well, let me just give you one example. My time has expired. Senator Nunn and I and a group of others were over at the Verkunde Conference this past weekend, and it was suggested during the course of the conference, the question was raised that if the United States were to unilaterally lift the embargo currently on arms going into Bosnia, that one or more of our allies would, in fact, deny the United States basing rights if we were ever called upon to help deliver weapons or munitions to the Bosnian Muslims. That is another example of the kind of questions we are likely to face in the future.

Dr. ZAKHEIM. And historically that has happened. We could not use French air space when we bombed Libya, and we could not use British or French bases when we supplied Israel in 1973. So, these things do shift.

The tradeoff is really between the F-22 and the B-2, and that is going to be very, very tough. It depends on what those who look into tactical aviation for the Air Force believe is the most appropriate short-term investment for long term operation. But it is not a tradeoff with ships.

Senator WARNER [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.

Ambassador WOLFOWITZ. If I might just comment on North Korea and also just say very briefly it does seem to me, if one tries to think about the kinds of problems we face in the future, that the kind of problem the F-22 is designed for, which was the central front in Europe in the combat of large combined air-land armies, is hard to see on the horizon, at least to me.

What I see as a very, very serious problem is the problem of counterproliferation, of how to disarm a country that has nuclear weapons, and we have seen how difficult that is even in the case of North Korea. I think Iran is on a course designed to have a much more substantial capability before anyone can claim they have one. I think the geography there is formidable.

I think the ability to punish is very important in our ability to deter terrorism. That strike on Libya really did have an effect, and not just on Libyans.

I think finally it is not only an uncertainty about bases, but the more one thinks that future problems will be in Asia—and I tend to see that as an increasingly important part of the world, as many people do—the distances, even when you have bases, are just phenomenal. They are not like anything we are used to. Indonesia, where I was ambassador, is a country that we do not think of very much. You put it on a map of the United States. It stretches from Seattle to Bermuda. You can fit an area the size, I think, 15 times the size of the United States, in the region of CINCPAC's responsibility.

On the question of North Korea, I am not an optimist. I think what we have done at best is to postpone the problem, and postponing it might in the long run be a good thing if we use the time well, but I am very concerned that so far from using the time well, there are two basic mistakes going on here.

Number one, we are in danger of surrendering our major leverage on North Korea, which is not their aspiration to have light water reactors sometime in the next century. They did not get into this program to produce power, and they are not going to get out of it for power. They were in it for nuclear weapons. What they signed this agreement for—I think it is absolutely clear—was to open up economic relations with the United States and particularly with Japan.

In 1991 the Japanese were on the verge of opening with North Korea. In fact, a then very powerful Japanese politician Kanemaru went to Pyongyang. There was all kinds of talk about normalization, about aid, about reparations, about investment. We went to the Japanese and said this has got to stop. There is a nuclear problem here, and frankly, many Japanese shared our view. The end result of 6 months of very successful diplomacy in 1991 was to produce a united U.S.-Japanese-Korean front that, in fact, briefly produced some of the real progress we made with North Korea and the first real inspections there.

I think what the North Koreans have gotten from this agreement is not only some absolute commitments by us to relax sanctions, but I think a kind of open door to the Japanese. Japanese politicians are now going to Pyongyang. One in particular was mentioned to me last night by some Koreans. There are careers to be made in Japan by breakthroughs in North Korea that will take away our leverage. That is point number one.

Point number two, I think we are going to live with a continuing uncertainty about North Korea's nuclear program and that is going to grow because the most we know is that they have frozen what we can see. I do not believe we can see everything in North Korea. I think the evidence suggests it.

If we are going to live with that, it seems to me it is absolutely essential to defuse the North-South conflict. So far from defusing it, the North Korean position has actually hardened in the course of these negotiations, and I think you see it in today's headlines that suggest they will refuse to accept South Korean reactors.

The real problem in Korea—and the nuclear problem is a subsidiary to this—is the refusal of North Korea to accept the existence of South Korea. As bizarre as that seems from a regime that is 50 years behind the rest of the world, that continues to be their

position and they deploy nearly 50 percent of their army along the DMZ to enforce that position. That is what has to change.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would agree with your second point that that is the fundamental part about the North Korean strategy that has to be joined and no agreement is going to work with them on anything, whether it is nuclear or anything else, unless we are absolutely hard-nosed about the dialogue and relationship between the North and the South. If we do not do that, we are making a colossal error whether we have an agreement or do not have an agreement or whether it is breached or whether it is not, whatever our economic relationship.

I would not agree that we have given up our economic leverage, though. Economic leverage is a continuing evolutionary situation. You do not give it up by opening liaison offices. We are not doing any trading with them now. Whatever we have done so far could be called off without affecting that GNP one iota.

Let me ask you a question, Dr. Wolfowitz. I agree with most of the points in your paper. I read it hastily here as you were going through your testimony. As I understand it, though, if I could get to a bottom line—and correct me wherever I am wrong on this—you are basically saying we ought to get away from a two regional war scenario to the extent that that drives a fixed force structure as the focal point of our defense efforts. Is that fair?

Ambassador WOLFOWITZ. I would put a major qualifier in. I think if we are going to get away from it, we better find some real anchor for defense spending because without that, I think we are in even worse trouble.

Senator NUNN. That is what I was asking. I do not see that anchor in your paper. I see the critique of the current anchor, which is the two regional war scenario, and I think you are right. It may drive us too much toward a fixed force structure without enough ability to adapt to changed circumstances and tradeoff between force structure and qualitative improvements and technology and so forth. So, I agree with your point, but I do think, as you just said, we need some anchor. My question is, what is that anchor?

We also see in all of your testimony a certain degree of critique, some more than others, of current strategy, the absence of strategy, but what I do not see is a strategy. I see a critique of where we are now, but I do not see the vision of where we ought to be going either with relationship to a strategy as opposed to what we have now, whatever someone may think it is, nor do I see an anchor for defense or a measuring tool by how we anchor defense.

You mentioned 3 percent of GNP and steadyding our defense budget now. I agree with you on steadyding our defense budget. We are at about 3 percent of GNP. Dr. Zakheim mentions to fund the current force structure, it would take 4.5 percent of GNP, which is substantially above where we are. So, there is a big dichotomy between your two testimonies on the amount of money.

My question really is, what is the strategy that you suggest, each of you, if you do not agree with the current strategy or if you do not believe we have one? And two, what is the thing we should be measuring our defense budgets against, if any?

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Let me try dealing with that since I did not say that we needed to spend 4.25 or 4.5 percent. I simply said that is what the BUR implied and I do not think that we can reach that level.

The first question relates to what is the strategy. I do not believe that in one session of testimony any individual, not even Bismarck, could come up with a strategy whole cloth. That is something that needs to be thought through. It is something that is going to take some time, and the point is that for the time being, we have a defense budget and no matter what our strategy is, for at least the next decade 80 percent of what we now have, that multi-trillion dollar inventory of equipment, is going to be with us.

We are really talking about the margin here. What we need to be doing is thinking now about what this strategy should be. What I tried to lay out were certain principles that are key to that strategy.

The first one is that we are the hub, and I think Dr. Wolfowitz said the same thing. We are the super power. That has to be a basic principle. We have to lead. We are not going to follow. We cannot be enmeshed in these collective security designs. It does not work. That is one key principle.

The second key principle is that we continue to believe that the best way to fight, if we have to fight, is as far away from our shores as possible, and our shores extend from this shore all the way to the other side of Hawaii. We are talking "forward." We are talking about forces in Europe. We are talking about forces in Asia. We are talking about forces in the Middle East. And that means alliances.

So far everything I have said is a carry-forward from what was done in the last 50-odd years, but it is not a Cold War strategy. It is what we are. Therefore, building on those blocks, building on the fact that 80 percent of whatever we will have in the year 2005 will be what we have today, we now have to look at how do we define a different approach, one that does not lock us into, as Dr. Wolfowitz said, just these two highly stylized scenarios that are wonderful for systems analysts—and I have played that game too—but are not "real world." We never have predicted any war we would be in. That is going to take a little bit of time, Senator.

Now, as to what ought to be the fiscal target, it seems to me that 3 percent is really the low end. We have never been below 3 percent except but once or twice, and certainly in 1940 and very, very early on in this century when we were not the world's only super power, when we were not a super power at all.

When we talk about several percent of our gross domestic product, what we are talking about is how much of all those goods and activities and services that this country produces should be devoted to defending the country so it can produce those goods and services. It seems to me that something over 3 percent—4 percent I do not think will wash in this country, but maybe 3 and a third percent—will give us the kind of growth we require. There is a constant real growth in defense spending that people refuse to acknowledge even though it is reality. You are an expert in operations and maintenance, Senator, and you know that the real costs keep going up, and the real cost of acquisition keeps going up because the new

systems are simply more sophisticated and more complicated than the ones they have replaced. We have to account for that real growth. Pegging it to some percentage of the GNP may not be a bad way to go. I would say somewhere between 3 and 3.5 percent may be the right answer, sir.

Ambassador WOLFOWITZ. If I might try on that, Senator. I certainly agree with Dr. Zakheim that trying to lay out a strategy is a major task, and I do not pretend to undertake it here.

But I do think that the heart of it starts with recognizing, as I mentioned earlier, the three major areas of the world from which major threats to the U.S. national security can arise, and that is why I think this committee historically has paid so much attention to Europe, to Northeast Asia, and to the Persian Gulf. The Persian Gulf, I would underscore, is important not because we are trying to hold down gasoline prices in the United States. It is because all of that energy is an enormous source of power both directly and indirectly as a weapon over the world's economy.

I think from that starting point, it seems to me that when one looks at the short term, in fact there are two contingencies that are critically important. One is the security of South Korea and the other is the security of the Arabian peninsula. But looking at those interests and figuring out whether we are able to deal with them is I think a different exercise from this question of sizing forces. It is related to our force size, but I think it is different.

I think when one looks at the long term, then you really have to begin to factor in the fact of the uncertainty of that future. Again, to go back to what I said, I think the most important thing is to make sure that we remain the world's number one military power.

Just think for a moment about how badly the world would change if, for example, at some point in the next century China were to seize a major lead in some area of military technology that was regarded as decisive. That is the kind of thing we want to prevent. And I mention China because I think of all the major powers around—and China is becoming bigger and bigger and projected by most reasonable estimates to continue that growth for quite a long time—China is the one about which there is the greatest uncertainty. This does not mean China is the next enemy. I think we could make no greater mistake than to follow a policy that ends up in a Cold War with China. It was bad enough to fight a Cold War with the Soviet Union which was a failing economy. I think to do one with China would be a bigger mistake, but to create a framework in which the incentives for China are to become part of a peaceful international order and not a challenge to it, I think is a major long-term goal.

Finally, when one looks at the long term—and this is, unfortunately, not that long term—is the increasing danger that some country intent on using them will acquire nuclear weapons, and how we deal with that I think has got to be essentially factored in.

On the question of anchor, which is the hardest question of all, I basically agree with what Dr. Zakheim said. There is a certain arbitrariness to saying we are going to have a certain percentage of our gross national product devoted to defense, but frankly it is not less arbitrary than the artificial construct of saying how many

wars we will fight. It is just that the arbitrariness is a little more obvious.

Senator NUNN. I think it might leave us more flexibility, so I do not disagree with your points on that. I think both of them are more valid points than the two war scenario which does tend to freeze in force structure, and I think that is the disadvantage of it. But I also, having been here, know it is a lot easier to debate and sell the two war situation than it would be to simply say, well, we need 3 percent of GNP. That is really tough to sell. It may be true but it is tough to sell.

I know my time has expired.

Senator WARNER. Would the former chairman like a minute or two?

Senator NUNN. No. I think our other witness wanted to answer the question.

Dr. BINNENDIJK. I would just mention that we do have a national strategy which is the strategy of engagement and enlargement. Given the fact that we are in transition to a new system, it was difficult to create that strategy. It is difficult to come up with anything that is much better. It is difficult to get from that national security strategy to the Bottom-Up Review.

As you suggested, the problem there is it may not be that good but there is nothing much better out there now, and events of the last 6 months indicate that we may, in fact, some day be faced with that kind of dual conflict. Paul Wolfowitz mentioned a moment ago Korea and the Gulf as the two areas where he sees potential conflict. That is the Bottom-Up Review strategy.

There are other approaches. You could take a capabilities approach and just list all of the capabilities that you need as a force without regard to the threat, but that does not sell. It is very hard to market that.

Second, you could say, well, we may have a peer competitor some day and that was the burden of my testimony and I think Paul Wolfowitz' as well. But if you decide who your peer competitor is now, you run the risk that you will make them the enemy, and it is also very hard to sell a defense structure based on an enemy that does not yet exist.

So, the alternatives to the Bottom-Up Review are not that good at this point. So, we go with what we have.

Senator NUNN. I thank all of you. I think all of your testimony has been very helpful. We appreciate your being here.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator Nunn.

First, would staff members here indicate to the chair the likelihood of any Senator coming to the hearing such that the chair can determine how much longer the hearing should go?

Gentlemen, I would like to turn to the question of the budget. I think your testimony has been very helpful, but let me give you a couple of practical observations.

Yesterday morning the Commandant of the Marine Corps had four or five Senators over for early breakfast to give a little perspective of the world from the Marine Corps viewpoint. We saw the preparations the Marines were undertaking to have a final evacuation from Somalia. As you might imagine, these preparations are very extensive to avoid any contingency that might result in risk

or loss of life to the U.N. forces that are remaining and also to our own forces that will be effecting this evacuation.

I asked the Commandant if he has in his budget the funds to cover this additional build-up in operation, and the answer was no. He said, furthermore, he does not have fourth quarter fiscal year 1995 O&M unless the Congress passes a supplemental, which I believe arrived late yesterday.

Now, here we are faced with a strong move to have a balanced budget and the fact that a balanced budget would directly affect defense. If I understand your testimony today, I think all of you are of the opinion that we need some additional defense dollars over and above the budget that was presented yesterday. Let me start from that baseline, just a simple yes or no. Do you feel we need additional defense spending?

Ambassador WOLFOWITZ. Yes.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Zakheim?

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Yes, sir.

Dr. BINNENDIJK. Yes, certainly in the out-years.

Senator WARNER. Well, then let us view this in terms of the other demands on our budget. I would have to say at the moment, while I support the chairman and members of this committee in seeking level funding and will support what additions we think we can get, the likelihood in my judgment is extremely remote. This brings me to my question.

If you are going to maintain our current force levels, if you are going to bring up the readiness, which we all agree is necessary, and we are not likely to get any additional money in fiscal year 1996, where does that money come from? In my judgment it is going to be the Congress exercising restraint, to the extent we can, on the President to go into deployments which are very costly and which have not been budgeted.

Now, we saw two very interesting chapters in our history in terms of Somalia and Haiti. I recall all so vividly the tragic losses of our troops there and a call from Congress to bring the troops back by Christmas. I was among those who resisted that call to allow the President to set the timetable, and by a very narrow margin, we prevailed. That narrow margin reminded me of a previous debate when the Congress, by only five votes, authorized the use of force in the Gulf. So, there are two chapters.

The third was Haiti. Congress was poised in any way it could to curtail the President in his intention to go in. We were talking about a day or two if someone could have gotten to the floor in some manner procedurally, primarily through power of the purse or otherwise, to curtail that operation.

Dr. Zakheim, you made reference to the staying power of the United States. I think the budget is going to be impacted by less deployments and that is predicated on a shortage of dollars and predicated on less staying power in our population as to what level of risk we will submit our troops to in the promulgation of a foreign policy.

My question to each of you is, do you agree or disagree with my observation that we are likely to see less involvement worldwide because of budgetary constraints and because of the lack of will-power here at home to utilize our troops where there is a risk in

the implementation of foreign policy? Why do we not just go right down the line? Dr. Wolfowitz?

Ambassador WOLFOWITZ. I do agree with you, Senator, and I think one of the things that we have learned over the last few years I think is that each of these deployments, when we make them, or each of these commitments, when we make them, may not seem so large, but when you start to take the aggregate of them, it is a very significant burden on the defense budget. It is a very significant burden on OPTEMPO of the services. It puts a lot of strain on a military that is under a lot of other strains. I think each time an individual decision comes up, it may look in some sense justified, but I think there really has to be a limit. It is kind of like budgeting your quota of these things. You just cannot do as many as the world is putting in front of us.

I think also, though I may be out of date in this comment, it seems to me that there are ways in this world to be more efficient in the conduct of a mission that I think is fundamental, and that is the maintenance of our forward presence. I think that mission is fundamental because it is part of the glue that holds together our alliances, and our alliances, as I said, I think are crucial to our future.

But I think particularly in a world that has changed as much as it has, and in a world where technology, for example, can give many surface combatants the offensive punch that usually only an aircraft carrier could have, to take a most graphic example, I think there are a lot of ways that we could probably be more flexible about our overseas deployments and presence that serve a military security function but that might be done more efficiently. I think we really have to look at that because we are stretched. We are stretched not only, as you said, in budgetary terms, but we are stretched in terms of what we are expecting our people to do.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Zakheim? Remember the central question is the impact of less deployments to conserve dollars and the lack of staying power that has been manifested here in this country.

Dr. ZAKHEIM. If I recall correctly, you asked if we will do more or will we do the same. I cannot answer that because after all is said and done, the President initiates these things.

The question I think I can try to answer is, should we do more or even the same? Here I am in agreement with Dr. Wolfowitz and with you. There has got to be a limit on all of this.

So, the next question that follows from that is, how do you limit what we do? It seems to me one way it can be limited—and I have written about this quite extensively—is by imposing the requirement that United Nations flag operations be funded outside of the Defense Department. In other words, if the Defense Department is going to undertake these operations, somebody else has to pay for them. I suggested the State Department because I do not think they are going to fund it. You will therefore create a natural inhibitor because the enthusiasm for sending the troops without the responsibility for finding the dollars is one that is very easy to develop, but the enthusiasm tends to wane in almost directly proportion to the amount of money spent to fund that enthusiasm.

If we are going to ask our troops to get involved in operations that are not vital to our national interests, that are not central to

our alliances, that are not necessary for the protection of our own people, to the extent that we are prepared to lose the lives of our sons and daughters, then we have to think very differently about doing so, particularly if we are operating under a command that is not our own.

Paul Wolfowitz just mentioned two words that I fully concur with, "efficiency" and "flexibility." Flexibility is the hallmark of what I wrote about in my written statement, and flexibility has to be what governs the way we look at the remaining 20 or so percent of the defense posture that we can influence with the budgets over the next few years and that will be with us for the next 30 or so. Those budgets should look toward how to most efficiently be flexible.

I come back to the point I made earlier to Senator Nunn. We cannot do that without a concept of strategy. I believe it is incumbent that we come up with one that allows us to answer these questions. I could not agree more with what Hans Binnendijk said. There is a strategy that has been promulgated, engagement and enlargement, but as he said himself, it is not one that you can relate to force structure. So, the question is, if it is not relatable to force structure, how useful is it for determining what that force structure should be? We need something to which we can relate in order allow us to make those decisions.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Binnendijk?

Dr. BINNENDIJK. Senator, there have been by our count 27 deployments of U.S. forces since Desert Storm, and as you indicated, that gets expensive. Your question was twofold. First, what is the impact of not doing some of those mission on our leadership position in the world? And I think it is significant. So, it may be that we just have to pay some of those costs.

But there also have to be some limits, which was your second question. PDD 25 has tried to set some limits on that. We may have to go further. The focus there was on end game. How do you get out of some of these deployments once you are in? More work has to be done there.

But when do you not go in? In the case of Rwanda, we had no national security interest in helping to stop that humanitarian disaster, but can you watch that on television and not do something about it? So, I am not sure that national security vital interests are the only tests here.

It seems to me there are some things you can do. You can multilateralize some of these operations and that is exactly what we are doing in Haiti. We are putting the burden in the longer run on the U.N. We do have to pick up some of that bill, but not all of it.

But I think there are some other guidelines that we can use. Where we can help with humanitarian efforts, where we can try to contain the conflict—that is what we are doing in Macedonia, that is what we are doing in the Adriatic—we should do it. We should contain the conflict but not engage ourselves directly because in that case I think that we will be embroiled in a Bosnian conflict that will backfire much as Somalia did and the effects will be disastrous for NATO. So, if you followed some of those guidelines, that is, cautious engagement, humanitarian where necessary—

Senator WARNER. Let me interrupt. That would be my next question. We will start with you. What is the formula by which the President, the Congress, and the American people decide to utilize our troops abroad in a manner over and above their ordinary operating tempo?

Dr. BINNENDIJK. You are referring here to the legislation in particular? Are you referring to how you would legislate that?

Senator WARNER. We might just indicate that many of us have talked about how there has got to be an absolutely clear linkage between our national security interest as a Nation and the deployment of our forces. Now, that may be weakened somewhat in cases, as you say Rwanda, where there is an overwhelming impulse here at home and abroad to go in and give some humanitarian relief.

Dr. BINNENDIJK. My own view, Senator—and this is certainly not the administration view—is that we need much more consultation. I think Congressman Hamilton has legislation along these lines. I would set up a fairly formal mechanism for periodic, constant consultations, a group, which would be both House and Senate, that the administration could work with in cases like this, consult with prior to a deployment, and begin to build a consensus that would be a national consensus. That is missing right now.

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Senator, first of all, humanitarian missions have been part of what we have always used the military for. Therefore, the question is in some sense, “under what circumstances do we undertake these and under which do we not?” It seems to me there ought to be two criteria.

If it is a humanitarian mission that seems to be open-ended, that is of a longer-term nature, there needs to be at least some discernable linkage to our overall national security interest. It may not be an obvious one to the man on the street or the woman on the street, but it ought to be reasonably obvious to both parties, to both the Hill and the administration, in other words, to the people who are making the decisions. Let me give you an example of that one.

We are operating a no-fly zone over Kurdistan. It was initiated by the previous administration. It has been maintained by this one. It is a humanitarian activity, but it is also an activity to limit Saddam Hussein, which is in America's national interest. It is not obvious to the person who watches TV and sees us helping a poor Kurd, which in and of itself is a good thing, but it is clear to those who look a little more closely at the problem that this is in the American national interest, as well as a humanitarian one. Given the kind of a country we are, very often humanitarian activities will be in our national interest, but we need to identify that.

The second one is in the event that there is not an obvious national interest like, for instance, the flood relief that our Marines provided to the people of Bangladesh. Then it has to be of a clear, limited nature. It cannot be open-ended. If it was the flood that Noah had to face, we might have had a different approach, but if it is short-term operation, if it is clear, then there is a pretty good case for doing it as we have historically done it. What troubles me is that there do not seem to be any criteria other than, as Senator Robb said, CNN for going in or not going in. That just cannot persist.

Ambassador WOLFOWITZ. I might just add, Senator—and I say this a little bit hesitantly because our relations with a number of our allies are pretty strained already, and this suggestion may just add more burden to them. But I do think one ought to look at the issue of burden sharing. The largest single deployment we made in the last 5 years was, of course, the deployment to the Persian Gulf, and if I am correct, we did not pay a single additional dollar for those deployments. We collected it in the most amazing burden sharing effort that I know of where we basically raised \$50 billion from other countries. One can say that is a special case. It certainly was a special case, but it also is a case where we would have acted and paid for it ourselves if we had to because it was in our national security interest.

I think when we go into burden sharing exercises with respect to humanitarian assistance, we should not start from the premise that the American forces are bought and paid for and now we will do a reasonable division of the remaining burden. I think it is reasonable for those countries that under-invest in defense to over-invest in humanitarian assistance, and it seems to me with some creativity it ought to be possible to move in that direction without, as I say, causing major damage to our relations with those countries, which is important. But to start with clear and plain and open accounting that did not hide the real costs that we are bearing—and I think we tend to hide those costs either intentionally or just because of the way the budget process works—so that we go into those discussions with allies with a clear sense of how much we have already given at the office.

Senator WARNER. I followed that very closely, that operation, as well as the subsequent one in the Gulf, and I do not think to date we have been fully compensated for the enormity of that expense here in September when we had to augment our forces over there. Some progress has been made, but still the American taxpayer is going to foot a heavy bill for September.

I am sure you did not mean to infer that our armed forces should be mercenaries and utilize them here, there, and elsewhere. They ought to just fill the tin cup with dollars. That would not sell at all.

Ambassador WOLFOWITZ. Absolutely not.

Senator WARNER. All right. We have got to be cautious there.

One minute for each on the issue of whether or not we should unilaterally remove the arms embargo as it relates to Bosnia. Dr. Wolfowitz.

Ambassador WOLFOWITZ. I guess I have grave reservations about lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, but I think it should have long ago been lifted on a multilateral basis.

Senator WARNER. History is one thing—

Ambassador WOLFOWITZ. And I think it should be lifted today on a multilateral basis, and I think there is a complete lack of seriousness on the part of the administration about the policy they give lip service to. I do not think they want it lifted. I do not think they are moving to lift it. Therefore, I think the pressure from the Congress to do something may, in fact, be the only way to get to a multilateral lifting, which I think is the best possible thing.

I would also add that I am very concerned that while we are following the lead of our allies in Bosnia, we seem to be in danger of following the lead of our allies in Iraq as well. One of the strongest arguments for sticking with the multilateral approach in Bosnia has been that, after all, maintaining sanctions on Iraq is a vital U.S. interest. I believe it is a vital U.S. interest. I am concerned that we are fighting a far too lonely fight and that we are starting to approach it with a kind of defeatist view. If we allow sanctions to be lifted on Saddam Hussein, it will be a terrible strategic mistake.

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Sir, let me quickly pick up on that last point with which I fully agree. I recently came across an Iraqi statement to the effect that all they need to do is hold out because "look what the United States did with North Korea." It troubles me terribly. We somehow think that no one else reads the newspapers, no one else watches CNN, no one else sees how we relate to different parts of the world other than theirs. It is just not true, and if we give way on the issue of Kuwaiti POW's or any of the other issues that the Security Council supported—this is a U.N. thing—then we damage our credibility worldwide, which brings me to Bosnia.

My sympathies are completely for lifting the embargo. I think, though, that certain questions need to be clarified which have not yet—

Senator WARNER. Of lifting it multinationally or unilaterally?

Dr. ZAKHEIM. I would even go as far as unilaterally, but we need to clarify certain questions and they have not, to my knowledge, been clarified.

First, what is going to happen with those safe havens? Will the Bosnians expect us to send troops in, or will there be some kind of slaughter on television and we will be called in to do something about it? I do not think this country wants to do that. So, we need some clarification there.

Will we have to provide air cover over Bosnia and take on whatever is left of the Serb Air Force? Maybe we should, but we need to clarify that.

If we do not clarify those issues, then whatever we do, whether we stay out or we go in, we are hurting ourselves. Part of the problem is, as Paul Wolfowitz just said, the absence of clarity, the absence of a clear understanding of what motivates us right now. Multilateralism is the obvious way to go in terms of lifting that embargo. There is no question about it. Are we bringing pressure to bear on our allies? I do not think we are, but we for ourselves need to answer those questions as well.

Dr. BINNENDIJK. Senator, I think unilaterally lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia would be a terrible mistake. I think it would deeply divide NATO, and the unity of NATO and its strength I think is a fundamental aspect of our national security strategy. So, for that reason alone I would not do it unilaterally.

But I think you would also have to see what would happen on the battlefield if we did it unilaterally. I think the immediate reaction would be that the Serbs, seeing this coming, seeing what they would perceive as a major flow of weapons to their enemy, would attack. They would attack quickly. I think they would probably win. The Bosnian Government would be in retreat. The Bosnian

Government would have no time to absorb those weapons to learn to use them properly. So, I think that what Dov Zakheim was saying about pressure for the United States to come to the rescue would be there.

I think beyond that, you have a high risk of spill-over of this conflict into Kosovo, which no one has thought too much about recently, but it is an explosive situation. I think lifting the arms embargo could lead to that explosion. Then we have a wider Balkan war, including NATO allies.

If we could do it multilaterally in a phased way, yes, but unilaterally, crossing all of our NATO allies, no.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for an excellent hearing.

The committee will stand in recess until the call of the chair.

[Question for the record with answer supplied follows:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Chairman THURMOND. How much money is required to add to the administration's requested levels for research and development and for procurement over the next 5 years?

Dr. ZAKHEIM. We project shortfalls of \$3 billion in research and development and \$163 billion in procurement for fiscal years 1996-2000. The disparity between the two accounts reflects the different cycles of R&D and procurement; in order to maintain a constant force without increasing its age, procurement of new systems must significantly exceed those provided for in the current plan.

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]



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